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DERIVATIVE WORKS 2.0: RECONSIDERING 
TRANSFORMATIVE USE IN THE AGE OF 
CROWDSOURCED CREATION 
Jacqueline D. Lipton & John Tehranian 
ABSTRACT—Apple invites us to “Rip. Mix. Burn.” while Sony exhorts us 
to “make.believe.” Digital service providers enable us to create new forms 
of derivative work—work based substantially on one or more preexisting 
works. But can we, in a carefree and creative spirit, remix music, movies, 
and television shows without fear of copyright infringement liability? 
Despite the exponential growth of remixing technologies, content holders 
continue to benefit from the vagaries of copyright law. There are no clear 
principles to determine whether any given remix will infringe one or more 
copyrights. Thus, rights holders can easily and plausibly threaten 
infringement suits and potentially chill much creative activity. This Article 
examines the impact of copyright doctrine on remixes with an emphasis on 
crowdsourced projects. Such an analysis is particularly salient at this 
juncture because consumers are neither as passive nor as isolated as they 
once were. Specifically, large-scale crowdsourced projects raise issues 
relating to copyright and fair use on a scope and scale never before 
imaginable. As such, this Article reflects on the particular problems raised 
by the growth of crowdsourced projects and how our copyright regime can 
best address them. We conclude that future legal developments will require 
a thoughtful and sophisticated balance to facilitate free speech, artistic 
expression, and commercial profit. To this end, we suggest a number of 
options for legal reform, including: (1) reworking the strict liability basis of 
copyright infringement for noncommercial works, (2) tempering damages 
awards for noncommercial or innocent infringement, (3) creating an 
“intermediate liability” regime that gives courts a middle ground between 
infringement and fair use, (4) developing clearer ex ante guidelines for fair 
use, and (5) reworking the statutory definition of “derivative work” to 
exclude noncommercial remixing activities.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of derivative works in copyright law is inherently 
problematic. Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act secures for copyright 
holders the exclusive right to “prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.”1 The Act then defines a derivative work as any “work 
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”2 Thus, the very 
statutory definition of what constitutes a derivative work seems to 
reserve—to the copyright holder—the exclusive right to “transform” an 
original work. 
At the same time, however, a related section of the federal copyright 
regime says something entirely different. The fair use doctrine, codified in 
§ 107 of the Act, involves a four-part balancing test. Courts have read the 
first factor—“the purpose and character of the use”3—to consider whether a 
 
1 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
2 Id. § 101 (emphasis added). 
3 Id. § 107. 
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particular use is transformative in nature.4 The more transformative the use, 
the more likely a court is to absolve a defendant from infringement 
liability. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[T]he goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of 
transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use 
doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of 
copyright . . . .”5 
Thus, on one hand, copyright’s derivative works doctrine seems to 
grant the exclusive right to engage in transformative use of a work to that 
work’s copyright holder. On the other hand, the fair use doctrine seems to 
suggest that transformative uses of works are precisely the types of works 
that copyright law should immunize from infringement liability. In short, 
copyright law sends us mixed messages. This Article analyzes the impact 
of this inherent tension within the Copyright Act on the practice of creative 
remixing, with a view toward suggesting legal reforms to attenuate some of 
the extant ambiguities in the law. The discussion is particularly timely in 
light of the House Judiciary Committee’s announcement in April 2013 of 
its plans to conduct a comprehensive review of American copyright law6—
a review that is active and ongoing.7 
 
4 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Castle Rock Entm’t, 
Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142–43 (2d Cir. 1998).  
5 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”).  
6 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., Chairman Goodlatte Announces 
Comprehensive Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
index.cfm/2013/4/chairmangoodlatteannouncescomprehensivereviewofcopyrightlaw [http://perma.cc/
PUL5-XZ4K]. 
7 The Judiciary Committee continues to review a wide variety of copyright-related issues, including 
the scope of fair use, copyright remedies, music licensing, moral rights, termination rights, resale 
royalties, and copyright duration. See, e.g., Hearing on Copyright Remedies Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014); 
Hearing on Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty, & Copyright Term Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014); 
Hearing on Music Licensing Under Title 17 Part I & II Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014); Hearing on the Scope of 
Fair Use Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014). Recent high-profile copyright disputes appear to have only increased the 
Committee’s resolve to conduct a broad reexamination of copyright law. For example, in response to 
the recent Supreme Court decision in the Aereo case, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob 
Goodlatte stated: 
Today’s Supreme Court decision reinforces the importance of the House Judiciary Committee’s 
ongoing review of our copyright law. The review is essential in determining whether the laws are 
still working in the digital age. It is my hope that we can identify improvements to our copyright 
laws that can benefit both the content community and the technology community, as well as 
consumers, by maintaining strong protections for copyrighted works and strong incentives for 
further innovation. 
Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., Goodlatte Statement on Supreme Court 
Decision in Aereo Case (June 25, 2014), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
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Not surprisingly, an examination of the history and evolution of 
copyright law sheds some light on this apparent internal contradiction in 
the scope of protection given to derivative works. Long ago, copyright was 
a law against piracy. The concept of infringement was limited to direct, 
one-to-one unauthorized reproductions of books, charts, and maps.8 But 
times have changed: today, the law of copyright does not merely protect an 
author against the scourge of pirated product. It secures the ability of rights 
holders to control entire derivative franchises that span multiple sectors of 
the economy and categories of consumption.9 Harry Potter is not merely a 
book series: it is a movie franchise, a bankable toy line, musical recordings, 
video and board games, mobile apps, Halloween costumes, branded 
clothing, jewelry, home decor, fashion accessories, kitchenware, and even a 
bedding line.10 And it is a singular feature of modern copyright law, the 
derivative rights doctrine, that allows Harry Potter’s author, J.K. Rowling, 
and her licensee, Warner Brothers, the exclusive ability to control this 
universe. 
Derivative rights are, no doubt, a boon to rights holders. Yet they may 
also serve public policy by incentivizing the creation of certain types of 
works that may not otherwise be made. For example, they enable studios to 
invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the financing of a movie because, 
if successful, it will spur the creation of sequels, spin-off television series, 
and toy and clothing lines.11 But there is also a dark side to the derivative 
rights doctrine. As digital technology and the tools of networked creativity 
have dispersed into the hands of ordinary people on an unprecedented 
scale, we are increasingly forced to confront this conundrum: At a time 
when individuals have a greater ability to make transformative use of 
creative works than ever before, the law is sharply limiting their ability to 
do so. If we wanted to make a remix of our favorite moments from the 
Harry Potter movies, could we do it without infringing copyright? What if 
we wanted to invite our friends to contribute their favorite scenes? And, if 
we wanted to post the resulting video mash-up on YouTube, would it make 
any difference if we accompanied the post with a notice asserting that the 




8 See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (limiting infringement claims to the 
unauthorized printing, reprinting, publishing, or vending of a copyrighted book, chart, or map). 
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012) (granting copyright owners the exclusive right “to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”). 
10 See Harry Potter, WBSHOP.COM, http://www.wbshop.com/category/wbshop_brands/harry
+potter.do?nType=2 [http://perma.cc/977J-A7JB]. 
11 This is a direct product of the exclusive right copyright holders enjoy to control the marketplace 
for any derivative works based on the original movie. See § 106(2). 
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As the law currently stands, if we do not obtain permission from the 
copyright holder (Warner Brothers in this case), the only way to ascertain 
whether our actions are infringing is to wait and see if Warner Brothers 
sues and then attempt to establish a successful fair use defense.12 
Unfortunately, the contradiction between the broad scope of the derivative 
rights doctrine, which seems to interdict all unauthorized transformative 
uses, and the first factor of the fair use defense, which strongly favors 
immunizing unauthorized but transformative uses from infringement 
liability, creates a state of affairs wrought with ambiguity. One can always 
litigate the question for a definitive answer, but litigation is time-
consuming and expensive. Moreover, under existing law, there is a good 
chance we would lose the suit and suffer backbreaking penalties.13 And 
even if we could afford litigation, assert the fair use defense, and win in the 
trial court, Warner Brothers would continue to appeal to higher courts 
where we might ultimately lose—or even win, but at staggering costs that 
create substantial chilling effects on remix-related activities. 
Given these risks, we may simply remove our work from YouTube or 
refrain from complaining if Warner Brothers convinces YouTube to do 
so.14 More worryingly, we may decide not to make—or at least not to 
post—the remix in the first place. Thus, despite its goal of fostering 
innovation,15 copyright law may be chilling a significant volume of 
harmless, and potentially beneficial, creative activity. There is no way of 
empirically measuring any such chilling effect; it is impossible to know 
how many works are neither created nor disseminated because of concerns 
about copyright infringement. But examples of the law’s chilling effect on 
remix culture abound.16 
 
12 See id. § 107 (fair use defense to copyright infringement). 
13 See id. § 504 (granting remedies in the form of statutory damages of up to $150,000 per act of 
willful infringement or, in the alternative, actual damages and a disgorgement of profits); id. § 505 
(granting courts the discretion to award costs and attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in copyright 
infringement suits). 
14 Under the “notice and takedown” mechanism in the Copyright Act, this is a simple process for 
copyright holders. See id. § 512. 
15 See, e.g., MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (5th ed. 2010) (“On 
the one hand, copyright law provides the incentive to create information and a shelter to develop and 
protect it. On the other hand, the copyright monopoly is a limited one—limited in time and scope by 
such doctrines as idea/expression, originality, and fair use. Viewed in this way, copyright law represents 
an economic tradeoff between encouraging the optimal creation of works of authorship through 
monopoly incentives, and providing for their optimal access, use, and distribution through limiting 
doctrines.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Comment, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common 
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 684 (1997) (“Copyright’s purpose . . . is to encourage creativity 
for the public interest, not only to ensure monopoly profits . . . .”). 
16 See, e,g., JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
61–62 (2011) (“There’s a lot of fun in sampling, and the sampling that we did do was a lot of fun and 
sparked a lot of creativity, but I think now it’s a little bit prohibitive to sample. It’s just so damn 
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Although one may argue that Harry Potter remixes and other such 
unauthorized uses of preexisting copyrighted materials are unimportant and 
contribute little to public discourse, we argue that there is significant value 
in encouraging this kind of creativity.17 Such transformative activities as 
remix, sampling, mash-ups, appropriationist art, parody, and satire advance 
progress in the arts by criticizing or illuminating our values, assessing our 
social institutions, and commenting on current events and our culture.18 A 
broad reading of the exclusive right of copyright holders to prepare 
derivative works threatens to enervate our creative marketplace. Remixes 
of popular works enable consumers to play with new technologies and to 
learn to use those technologies to express themselves. They are also a form 
of communication between consumers on a global level. Where remixes are 
crowdsourced, they enable people to benefit from creative interactions in 
developing new works. Finally, the output of these efforts provides an 
important benefit by publicizing new works of art imbued with original 
meanings, messages, and expressions. 
While we do not advocate breaking or ignoring the law, we do suggest 
that insufficient attention has been paid in copyright discourse to the 
important social benefits inhering in creative remixing activities. The 
problem for fans of popular works is that copyright law, including the fair 
 
expensive, and it’s such a hassle trying to clear things. As far as sampling goes, it’s an interesting area 
these days, because it’s definitely been dying out. It hasn’t been arranged in a way where it’s workable 
for musicians to do it.” (quoting Beck as identifying the substantial impact of the law on his creative 
decisionmaking and why his more recent albums, like Guero, have relied less extensively on 
sampling)); 2 BATTLEGROUND: THE MEDIA 347 (Robin Andersen & Jonathan Gray eds., 2008) (“Public 
Enemy pulled the track ‘Psycho of Greed’ from their 2002 album Revolverlution because of the 
exorbitant fee for using a sample from the Beatles’ ‘Tomorrow Never Knows.’”); Kembrew McLeod, 
How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop: An Interview with Public Enemy’s Chuck D and Hank 
Shocklee, STAY FREE! MAG., Fall 2002, http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/archives/20/
public_enemy.html [http://perma.cc/MG5L-M7YR] (documenting how copyright litigation over 
sampling has caused hip–hop groups to change their production style and limit the number of samples 
they use); Julia Halperin, Is Prince v. Cariou Already Having a Chilling Effect? Contemporary Artists 
Speak, BLOUIN ARTINFO (Jan. 2, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/758352/is-
prince-v-cariou-already-having-a-chilling-effect [http://perma.cc/MD9F-29NM] (discussing the chilling 
effects on appropriationist art stemming from the lower court decision in Prince v. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 
2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013)); Benjamin 
Jackson, Why Remix Culture Needs New Copyright Laws, BUZZFEED (Oct. 24, 2012, 3:32 PM), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/benjaminj4/why-remix-culture-needs-new-copyright-laws [http://perma.cc/
969J-6U76] (noting the impact of copyright law on the commercialization of creative works containing 
samples). 
17 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY 77 (2008) (noting that engaging in remixing activities is valuable even if the actual content 
produced by the remixes is not). 
18 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 684 (“People should be able to participate actively in the creative 
aspects of the world around them. When most creative output is controlled by large corporations, 
freedom to modify and elaborate on existing characters is necessary to preserve a participatory element 
in popular culture.” (footnote omitted)). 
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use defense, is currently too vague and flexible in operation to provide 
necessary guidance to remixers about the legality of their activities.19 
Because remixes of articles of popular culture are socially beneficial and do 
little commercial harm to copyright holders, we argue that lawmakers 
should provide clearer guidelines to protect remixing activities. In many 
instances, the social benefits of creative remixes can outweigh the harm to 
copyright holders. As such, copyright law should more clearly reflect this 
possibility. 
Part I discusses the social benefits inherent in remixing activities, with 
a particular focus on crowdsourced remixes. Crowdsourced projects are 
creative enterprises where individuals (often strangers) scattered across the 
globe work on editing, revising, adding to, and subtracting from creative 
works in an iterative process.20 They are the new wave of consumer 
creativity online, and little has been written on the application of copyright 
doctrine to these activities. We intend to contribute to this debate by 
addressing ways in which crowdsourced projects differ from individual 
consumer remixes, and identifying specific problems created for 
crowdsourced projects by the vagaries of copyright law. While our 
discussion covers both individual and crowdsourced remixing projects, we 
aim to emphasize the differences between the two. In particular, large-scale 
crowdsourced works may have more commercial potential than short 
individual fan mash-ups. The greater potential to commercialize a large-
scale project might be perceived as a threat to copyright holders, and this 
could impact how the fair use defense is applied. The fair use defense 
requires a court to conduct a significant examination of the extent to which 
a defendant’s work potentially impacts the value or market for the 
plaintiff’s protected material,21 so the differences between individual and 
crowdsourced remixing projects can bear heavily on the effectiveness of 
the fair use defense. 
Part II introduces relevant aspects of copyright law, focusing on ways 
in which artistic crowdsourced projects may infringe copyright and whether 
defenses such as fair use might excuse infringement. Again, we will 
contrast more traditional fan mash-ups with larger-scale crowdsourced 
projects. This Part concludes with a case study of the recent Star Wars: 
Uncut film as an unauthorized crowdsourced fan remix of a Star Wars 
movie. The case study demonstrates the ways in which large-scale creative 
 
19 Jacqueline Lipton, Copyright’s Twilight Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons from the Vampire 
Blogosphere, 70 MD. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2010) (discussing this issue in relation to video mash-ups 
involving popular movies).  
20 See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
21 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
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products that draw significantly on existing copyrighted works pose 
particular problems for copyright law. 
Part III draws together the issues raised in Part II by discussing new 
challenges for copyright law and the fair use doctrine in particular. We 
advocate the development of new copyright policies that better account for 
the advent and value of large-scale remixing activities. Part IV concludes 
with a summary of the challenges for copyright law in the age of digital 
remixing, and with suggested directions for future legal developments to 
address the challenges posed by crowdsourcing and remixing. 
I. REMIXING AND CROWDSOURCING 
A. Risk and Reward in Remixing: The Recent History22 
We begin our analysis by looking at the recent history of remixing, 
including its treatment under the law and its impact on the arts and artists. 
The practice of remixing has come under direct fire since the first reported 
decision to consider the legality of sampling resulted in substantial liability 
for rapper Biz Markie in 1991.23 Sampling is the practice of taking portions 
of a preexisting recording and integrating them into a recording featuring 
other music and lyrics in order to form a new song.24 The permissibility of 
sampling speaks directly to the broader issue of whether making pastiche 
uses of underlying materials to create new finished products—as in the case 
of remixing—is legal. Until the early 1990s, no court had considered 
whether such uses—only recently made possible with the advent of 
splicing technologies, and quickly popularized in hip–hop—constituted 
infringement or fair use.25 In Grand Upright Music, Markie famously faced 
infringement allegations for using a piano riff from Gilbert O’Sullivan’s 
“Alone Again (Naturally)” without authorization or payment.26 In a 
decision that betrayed the legal intricacies and novelty of the issue, the 
judge quoted Exodus and sophistically equated the Seventh Commandment 
 
22 Portions of Part I.A come from Derek Khanna & John Tehranian, Comment Regarding 
Reforming Statutory Damages for Transformative Uses, Response to the National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration Request for Comments on Department of Commerce Green Paper on 
Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, Docket No. 130927852-3852-01 
(Nov. 11, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/khanna_-_tehranian_comments.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/KHG8-4FDB]. 
23 Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
24 For example, the Oxford Dictionary defines “sampling” (in this context) as “[t]he technique of 
digitally encoding music or sound and reusing it as part of a composition or recording.” Sampling, 
OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/sampling
?q=sampling [http://perma.cc/5QUP-YB8S]. 
25 See Khanna & Tehranian, supra note 22, at 3. 
26 Grand Upright Music Ltd., 780 F. Supp. at 183. 
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with the law of copyright by concluding, “Thou shalt not steal.”27 By 
conflating copyright infringement with theft of a biblical proportion and 
imposing the attendant moral and ethical culpability that follows, the court 
failed to acknowledge the nuanced artistic and economic stakes in the 
sampling debate. The result of the decision was not just the issuance of an 
injunction against Markie; the case also triggered Markie’s referral to the 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York for potential 
prosecution under criminal copyright laws.28 More recently, in Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, a federal appellate court held that any 
unauthorized sample of a sound recording, no matter how small, 
constituted copyright infringement: “Get a license or do not sample.”29 
Such an absolute position not only ignores the existence of the fair use 
doctrine, but also fails to account for the competing private and social 
interests involved in the act of sampling. 
To be fair, not all courts have found liability against unauthorized 
samplers.30 But many have, making it difficult for artists to predict the 
likely outcome of a fair use defense. To avoid any specter of liability, 
record labels have pushed artists to be incredibly conservative in their 
practices, to the point where labels often will not release records with 
unlicensed samples even if a legitimate fair use argument exists. William 
Patry, author of one of the leading treatises on copyright law, explains the 
problematic consequences of current law: 
The result of [the Bridgeport Music court’s] terrible decision has been an 
unwillingness of record companies to put out albums unless each and every 
sample is cleared. Producers of records must certify that all samples have been 
licensed . . . . Since previous hip-hop albums used hundreds (and sometimes 
thousands) of samples, licensing that number of samples is out of the question 
due to financial and transactional cost reasons. As a result, the creative 
process of hip-hop has changed.31 
Take the case of Paul’s Boutique by the Beastie Boys, which came out 
in 1989 and is considered one of the most influential and innovative hip–
 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 185. 
29 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
30 See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (excusing unauthorized sample by 
the Beastie Boys of underlying musical composition on the grounds that the use was de minimis, 
particularly in light of the fact that the Beastie Boys had obtained a license for use of the sound 
recording containing the musical composition); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967 BRO 
(CWx), 2013 WL 8600435, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (finding that use of a percussive “horn hit” 
in Madonna’s Vogue, even if sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection, amounted to 
nonactionable de minimis use). 
31 WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 93 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
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hop albums of all time.32 It featured more than 100 samples, some of them 
unlicensed.33 This level of sampling led to a unique final product. As Mike 
Simpson, who produced the album, has explained, “[W]hat we were doing 
was making entire songs out of samples taken from various different 
sources. On Paul’s Boutique everything was a collage.”34 Today, Simpson 
notes, clearing all necessary samples would be “unthinkable.”35 Indeed, law 
professor Jason Mazzone estimates that the current cost of obtaining 
clearances, along with finding and tracking down every single artist, would 
amount to over $3 million.36 Paul’s Boutique could never be affordably 
created under the existing legal regime. 
Innovators inevitably stand on the shoulders of those who came before 
them, and laws that restrict the inherently iterative process of creation 
ultimately harm the robustness of the arts. Consider Public Enemy’s “Don’t 
Believe the Hype” from 1988, a work that would have been economically 
prohibitive to produce in the wake of recent case law on sampling. The 
song builds on the work of at least seven different preexisting sound 
recordings, including James Brown, whose songs are sampled throughout 
the track.37 But Public Enemy was not merely taking. It was giving, too—
and not just to fans of rap and hip–hop; “Don’t Believe the Hype” has itself 
been sampled by at least sixty-six other songs.38 Many prominent artists, 
from the expected (The Game, N.W.A., and The Roots) to the unexpected 
(U2, Weezer, and the unforgettable Milli Vanilli), have used the track to 
create their own works.39 
Remixing and sampling are therefore not merely the pastime of a few 
college students residing in dorms and tinkering with their turntables. 
Instead, these practices form the cohesive tissue that connects music and 
people through a shared culture. They are part of a rich, referential 
methodology that has long fueled innovation in all forms of content 
creation. Long before remixing and sampling ever became viable, writer 
 
32 Tom Mann, How Beastie Boys ‘Paul’s Boutique’ Changed Everything, FASTERLOUDER (Feb. 12, 
2014), http://www.fasterlouder.com.au/features/38414/How-Beastie-Boys-Pauls-Boutique-changed-
everything [http://perma.cc/CCC9-LBR8]. 
33 Jason Mazzone, The Day the Music Died, BLSLAWNOTES, Fall 2011, at 28–29, 
http://www.brooklaw.edu/~/media/PDF/Admissions/49196BLS_LawNotes.ashx [http://perma.cc/9ZT4-
VKLP]; Paul Tingen, The Dust Brothers: Sampling, Remixing & The Boat Studio, SOUND ON SOUND 
(May 2005), http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/may05/articles/dust.htm [http://perma.cc/BWP2-
QPX7]. 
34 Tingen, supra note 33. 
35 Id. 
36 Mazzone, supra note 33, at 30. 
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Donald Barthelme highlighted the power of mash-ups, juxtapositions, and 
appropriation. The ultimate tool of the genius, he wrote, is rubber cement.40 
Yet the law is taking the tool of rubber cement—the very stuff that enables 
artistic pastiche and the repurposing and reconstructing of creative 
content—out of the hands of musicians and other artists. 
When viewed in both comparative and historical contexts, the inability 
of modern creators to make use of the raw materials of their musical, 
literary, and artistic progenitors is nothing short of striking. Warhol could 
draw on the iconography of Marilyn, Mao, Marlon, and Muhammad.41 
Elvis Presley and the members of Led Zeppelin could riff on the rhythm 
and blues of their youth.42 Marcel Duchamp could take Da Vinci’s Mona 
Lisa and turn her into the mustachioed subject of ribald word play 
(L.H.O.O.Q.).43 And, luckily, courts have not yet taken away the ability of 
writers to quote the words of others. Yet the rulings on digital sampling 
have effectively foreclosed the ability to reference and transform other 
music at all. The current case law on remixing and sampling impedes the 
development of electronic dance music, the work of mash-up artists, and 
innovation in virtually every genre of modern music and every facet of 
contemporary art. 
B. Remixing and Crowdsourcing 101 
Despite the value of sampling and other forms of remixing to artists 
and the public alike, the practice has come under significant legal pressure 
in recent years. The law’s impact on the development of the arts and on 
expressive activities is growing even more pronounced as modern 
networked technologies have enabled new forms of remixing to take place 
through the process of crowdsourcing. To better understand the stakes, it 
behooves us to examine the relationship between remixing and 
 
40 DONALD BARTHELME, The Genius, in SADNESS 23, 26 (1972). 
41 See, e.g., Andy Warhol Biography, WARHOL, http://www.warhol.org/collection/aboutandy/
biography/ [http://perma.cc/69YS-5RNX]; Andy Warhol, Muhammad Ali, 1978, synthetic polymer and 
silkscreen inks on canvas, 101.6cm x 101.6cm; Andy Warhol, Marlon, 1966, silkscreen ink on canvas, 
104.2cm x 117.1cm. 
42 Of course, such unauthorized riffing, and the subsequent economic success that came from it 
despite the absence of permission from or payment to the individuals whose works “inspired” Led 
Zeppelin, Presley, and others, is not without serious racial implications. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, 
Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, 
Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 762–65 (2007) (discussing efforts of the Estate 
of Willie Dixon, an African-American blues musician, to litigate successfully against Led Zeppelin for 
its uncredited, unauthorized, and uncompensated lifting of “You Need Love” for its song, “Whole Lotta 
Love”); K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over African-American 
Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1193 (2008) (“The fleecing of Black artists was the 
basis of the success of the American music industry . . . .”). 
43 Marcel Duchamp, L.H.O.O.Q., 1919, pencil on reproduction of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, 
19.7cm x 12.4cm. 
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crowdsourcing, and the particular legal claims at issue in this brave new 
world of interactive and iterative audience-driven creation. 
Remixing and crowdsourcing are related, but distinct, concepts. Only 
in recent years have crowdsourced remixes begun to gain prominence in 
online culture. A remix is best described as a form of “collage” that uses 
text, audio, video, or some combination thereof.44 As Professor Lawrence 
Lessig notes, new digital technologies enable anyone to create new content 
using existing text, music, or video45 to share in this form of creativity.46 
The resulting creative works can serve as sophisticated commentary, pure 
entertainment, or simple and unadulterated self-expression.47 
Though the term “remix” has largely been used in the context of 
digital culture in recent years, music remixes predate this technology by 
many years and involve similar concepts of joining together different 
musical elements to create a new work or new version of an existing work. 
Rap music is an obvious example of a musical form where different layers 
or sources are often piled together in a kind of collage.48 On Paul’s 
Boutique, for example, the Beastie Boys interweave at least seventeen 
samples of preexisting works over the lyrics and music of “Hey Ladies,” a 
three-minute song.49 Often a preexisting work is borrowed and used to 
create a new message.50 
Creative remixes are remixes whether or not they utilize new 
technologies, and they are often thought of as individual or small group 
 
44 LESSIG, supra note 17, at 70–71 (comparing physical collage with digital collage). Professor 
Lessig has also described remixing as quoting a wide range of texts to produce something new. Id. at 69 
(“[Read/write media] remix, or quote, a wide range of ‘texts’ to produce something new. These 
quotes . . . happen in different layers. Unlike text, where the quotes follow in a single line[,] . . . 
remixed media may quote sounds over images, or video over text, or text over sounds. The quotes thus 
get mixed together. The mix produces the new creative work—the ‘remix.’”). 
45 Id. at 69 (“Using the tools of digital technology—even the simplest tools, bundled into the most 
innovative modern operating systems—anyone can begin to ‘write’ using images, or music, or video.”). 
46 Id. (“[U]sing the facilities of a free digital network, anyone can share that writing with anyone 
else.”). 
47 Id. at 71–74 (giving examples of remixes for various different purposes). 
48 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 315 (discussing “sampling” from various musical sources when 
creating rap and hip–hop music). 
49 Tingen, supra note 33 (“On Paul’s Boutique everything was a collage. There was one track on 
which the Beastie Boys played some instruments, but apart from that everything was made of 
samples.”); Hey Ladies, WHOSAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com/Beastie-Boys/Hey-Ladies/ 
[http://perma.cc/LBH9-RVMY]. 
50 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994) (finding 2 Live Crew’s 
hip–hop parody of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” transformative and entitled to the fair use defense 
because, inter alia, “2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, 
with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility” and 
because “[t]he later words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as 
a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies”). 
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projects.51 Crowdsourcing, on the other hand, has quickly blossomed with 
the birth and evolution of digital communications media and networked 
technologies, and crowdsourced work is typically defined by the artistry of 
numerous contributors. Wikipedia—perhaps the world’s most successful 
crowdsourced work52—defines crowdsourcing as “the process of obtaining 
needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large 
group of people, and especially from an online community, rather than 
from traditional employees or suppliers.”53 Although crowdsourcing is not 
new to the Internet age,54 interactive Web 2.0 technologies55 enable 
crowdsourced projects of a scope and on a scale never before possible.56 
Much early digital crowdsourcing was more scientific or functional than 
artistically creative. For example, although it technically constitutes a 
literary work,57 Wikipedia is fundamentally a contribution to general 
knowledge in a variety of areas of human interest. Recent Search for 
Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI)58 projects59 invoked crowdsourcing to 
gather and share data involving the search for intelligent life outside the 
Earth environment.60 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) has used crowdsourcing to map the surfaces of extraterritorial 
bodies.61 
 
51 LESSIG, supra note 17, at 71–74 (giving examples of remixes that happen to have been created 
by individuals). 
52 Wikipedia describes itself as a “free-access, free content Internet encyclopedia” that allows 
“[a]lmost anyone who can access the site [to] edit almost any of its articles.” See Wikipedia, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia [http://perma.cc/4HXL-DXZA] (footnote omitted). 
53 See Crowdsourcing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdsourcing [http://perma.cc/
L8SP-PTHU]. 
54 See, e.g., SIMON WINCHESTER, THE PROFESSOR AND THE MADMAN 101–14 (1998) (describing 
the way in which the original Oxford English Dictionary was created via crowdsourcing). 
55 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 27 (describing “Web 2.0” as “the current jargon commonly 
associated with interactive information sharing, interoperability, and user centered design”). 
56 Id. (“[T]oday’s web, with its rich user generated material, metadata, and dynamic content, allows 
users to do more than retrieve information and it promotes innovative ways to both create, exploit, and 
preserve copyrighted works.” (footnote omitted)). 
57 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“‘Literary works’ are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in 
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material 
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which 
they are embodied.”). 
58 SEARCH FOR EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCE INST., http://www.seti.org/ [http://perma.
cc/K5GS-QZ92]. 
59 SETIQUEST, http://setiquest.org/about [http://perma.cc/SSX-79LH] (“[S]etiQuest is a community 
involvement that will lead to a significant improvement in our ability to search for other intelligent 
civilizations in the cosmos, and in the process, to use SETI to change the world.”).  
60 Jane Wakefield, SETI Live Website to Crowdsource Alien Life, BBC NEWS (Feb. 29, 2012, 
7:24 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-17199882 [http://perma.cc/XX82-FNY3]. 
61 NASA and Planetary Resources Sign Agreement to Crowdsource Asteroid Detection, NASA 
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nasa.gov/content/nasa-and-planetary-resources-sign-agreement-to-crowd
source-asteroid-detection/#.UsGKV7R0lH0 [http://perma.cc/GRD8-ZA7Y]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
396 
However, some crowdsourced projects are more creative and artistic 
than functional. For example, a virtual world like Second Life62 is 
effectively a crowdsourced project. Individuals from around the globe 
contribute the characters and environments of these virtual worlds. People 
create avatars63 and participate in these virtual communities to fulfill 
expressive and creative, rather than scientific or functional, goals. Virtual 
worlds involve both artistic development (in the designing of elements of 
the virtual milieu) and social interaction (in the communications between 
participants). They promote very different values from the Wikipedia, 
NASA, and SETI projects. They are not about gathering, collating, and 
disseminating information. Rather, they foster self-expression, creativity, 
and individual autonomy.  
While it is possible to crowdsource a remix, not all crowdsourced 
projects will be creative remixes of existing works. Many involve 
technological or scientific advances, and many revolve around the creation 
and development of new data or information, rather than remixing existing 
works.64 The Harry Potter remix described in the Introduction is intended 
as a paradigmatic example of a creative crowdsourced remix.65 It is this 
kind of project on which the remainder of our discussion focuses. 
In our Harry Potter scenario, we are engaging in a crowdsourced 
project for an expressive purpose, as in the case of a virtual world. The 
difference is that, in our Harry Potter scenario, we are borrowing—or 
copying or remixing—protected material created and owned by someone 
else. Even if we add new text, music, or insights to the video clips, we still 
take underlying video clips (and potentially some of the additional music or 
text) from works created by others. 
Our aim is to express ourselves and our affection for, or commentary 
upon, the movies. We do not intend to compete commercially with the 
 
62 JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL 350 (2008) (“[Second Life is an] Internet-based, 
virtual world released by Linden Lab in 2003. . . . Inspired by the cyberpunk literary movement, Second 
Life is a user-generated world where people can play, interact, do business, and communicate using an 
avatar interface and a virtual currency, the Linden dollar, which is tied to the U.S. dollar.”).  
63 An “avatar” is “a graphical image that represents a person, as on the Internet.” Avatar, 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/avatar?s=t [http://perma.cc/9FLR-WN2H]. 
64 Two examples of information or data-based crowdsourcing include the traffic and navigation app 
Waze and the health app OutSmart Flu. See Jacquelyn Bengfort, Crowdsourcing Campus Health with 
Mobile Apps and Data, EDTECH (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.edtechmagazine.com/
higher/article/2013/11/crowdsourcing-campus-health-mobile-apps-and-data [http://perma.cc/FS8C-
N7C8] (“Waze users form a community, allowing them to report hazards and accidents through the app, 
which sends out updates to other users in the area. . . . Like Waze, OutSmart Flu appeals to users’ 
altruism. ‘It’s not unlike if you and I were to meet, and I wasn’t feeling well, and you put out your hand 
to shake mine. I might say, “You don’t want to touch me, I’m not feeling well.”’ OutSmart Flu lets the 
UW–Madison community amplify that warning to a larger group.”). 
65 See supra notes 10–18 and accompanying text. 
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copyright owners. However, copyright law to date has not done a 
particularly good job of clarifying whether, or the extent to which, this kind 
of noncompetitive expressive use of protected works can be regarded as 
fair use.66 In other words, if we ask ten copyright lawyers whether our 
Harry Potter remix would be protected by the fair use doctrine, we could 
easily get ten different, nuanced responses. The answers would likely 
depend on variables such as where the remix is posted, whether there is 
advertising revenue generated from it and how many video clips we use, 
how long they are, and the context in which they are used.67 However, in 
any formal opinion letter, virtually all of the lawyers would agree on one 
thing: our safest course of action would be to get a license. The reason is 
simple: even if there is a compelling reason to believe that our planned 
activity falls under the fair use exception, there is always a chance that a 
court would disagree. Therefore, to protect us from liability and to 
immunize themselves from a malpractice suit—lest you rely on their advice 
and things go awry—rational lawyers will generally recommend paying the 
rights holder. Considerable rights accretion for copyright holders results 
from the fear of litigation (no matter the outcome) and the need for legal 
counsel to protect itself from allegations of malpractice. 
This Article seeks to identify whether there are ways in which the law 
could provide clearer, upfront guidance to expressive remixers about the 
degree to which their activities may be regarded as fair use, or otherwise 
lawful. While this discussion will apply to individual as well as 
crowdsourced remixes, the latter may raise different concerns to copyright 
holders than the former, depending on the scope and scale of the group 
project. As our case study of the Star Wars: Uncut project, discussed in 
Part II, demonstrates, crowdsourcing enables the creation of new work, the 
individually contributed components of which may not infringe copyrights 
but which taken as a whole may amount to infringement.68 
To borrow from computer science terminology, thinking separately 
about “inputs” and “outputs” of a creative crowdsourced project assists in 
the analysis. Inputs represent those elements of a crowdsourced project that 
are contributed by individual participants. Inputs are then collated together, 
either by the group as a whole or by the project organizers, to create a 
single output: the finished crowdsourced work. The output may be fixed as 
to form or may be constantly updated. 
 
66 The fair use doctrine and its ambiguities will be discussed in further depth in infra Part II.C. 
67 See, e.g., Wade Williams Distribution, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., No. 00 Civ. 5002(LMM), 2005 
WL 774275, at *7–11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2005) (weighing a fair use defense for a Good Morning 
America segment exploring portrayal of aliens in American film by considering, inter alia, the 
commerciality of the segment as well as the number of clips used, their nature and length, and their 
contextual proximity to the segment’s commentary). 
68 See infra Part II.D. 
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For example, in our Harry Potter scenario, “inputs” include the 
individual video clips our friends forward to us. Together, we mash up the 
videos to create the “output”—the completed fan remix video. Unlike 
Wikipedia—a crowdsourced project whose output is constantly evolving—
we might choose to fix the form of our remix such that it will not change 
after we have posted it publicly. 
In the case of the Harry Potter remix, our inputs are likely to be 
predominantly drawn from the work of others. If our work is a compilation 
of our favorite scenes from the movies, perhaps joined together with some 
commentary or music, much of that input will be protected work. Some of 
these individual borrowings may, at least in theory, infringe copyrights.69 
Additionally, our final product—the crowdsourced remix—may itself 
infringe copyright.70 The remix would undoubtedly be regarded as a 
derivative work drawn from the work of others, and, of course, copyright 
law reserves to original copyright holders the right to make derivative 
works. 
But with both inputs and outputs, there is a potential fair use defense. 
For example, we could argue that our uses are fairly minor in substance71 
and are not commercially competing with Warner Brothers’ copyrighted 
movies.72 We might also argue express or implied license, if Warner 
Brothers has ever released video clips for use by fans for noncommercial 
purposes.73 While our fair use arguments may have a good chance of 
success, the only way to know for sure would be to incur the costs of going 
to court and arguing the case. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that some crowdsourced creative 
projects may look more like copyright infringement than others. Star Wars: 
Uncut, for example,74 is a creative crowdsourced project that recreates the 
entire storyline of Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope.75 Because it is a 
full-length movie in and of itself and follows the general storyline of the 
original movie, it may more easily be regarded as infringing on Lucasfilm’s 
 
69 Posting to the Internet individual scenes from copyrighted films violates, inter alia, the copyright 
holder’s exclusive right to reproduce, publicly perform, and make derivative versions of the work. 
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(2), (4) (2012).  
70 See id. 
71 See id. § 107(3). 
72 See id. § 107(4). 
73 Conduct and communications by a rights holder can, depending on their context and nature, give 
rise to a cognizable implied license to make use of protected works in ways that go beyond any express 
agreement. See, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing an implied license 
from context of rights holder’s conduct).  
74 See discussion infra Part II.D.  
75 STAR WARS EPISODE IV: A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm 1977). 
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(now Disney’s76) derivative works right than, say, our hypothetical Harry 
Potter remix. However, the question remains whether such a derivative 
work actually does any harm to Disney’s valuable property. Although 
modern courts are unlikely to see it this way, the work might in fact 
increase the market for the original movie by reminding people how much 
they enjoyed the movie and that they would like to watch it again and 
compare it with the remix.77 
These issues are taken up in more detail below. Part II examines the 
mechanics of copyright law as it might apply in the crowdsourced remix 
context. It focuses specifically on the application of the fair use defense in 
this context. However, before turning to that discussion, it is important to 
identify the kinds of social interests inherent in online remixing. Having 
identified these interests, we then examine whether today’s copyright law is 
capable of appropriately protecting these interests in a meaningful way. 
Copyright law should ideally be able to effectively balance the rights of 
copyright holders against the interests of others who may seek to use 
protected works in an expressive manner. To the extent the law fails to 
create such a balance, it may ultimately chill more artistic innovation than 
it facilitates. 
C. Crowdsourcing and Consumer Interests in Copyright Works 
Both individual and crowdsourced remixing have represented an 
important source of creative enterprise for many generations. Our copyright 
laws and their surrounding mythology of creativity have historically 
embraced a romantic notion of authorship—one that envisions creative 
enterprise as the product of a lone genius conceiving of canonical works ex 
nihilo.78 Despite its powerful imagery, this romantic canard has never fully 
captured the realities of artistic creation. Notwithstanding the popular idea 
that creators operate in a vacuum, authors in the material world inevitably 
“stand on the shoulders of giants” by building on the work of others to 
arrive at their creative output.79 Throughout history, the act of creation has 
been an iterative process. In some cases, this process has involved the 
 
76 Matt Krantz et al., Disney Buys Lucasfilm for $4 Billion, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2012, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/10/30/disney-star-wars-lucasfilm/1669739/ 
[http://perma.cc/K3C7-ZJJ8]. 
77 See David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 359, 
378–85 (2014) (articulating a taxonomy of ways in which unauthorized uses of copyrighted works of 
authorship may enhance, rather than reduce, demand for the work). 
78 See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 51–60 (1996); James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and 
the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455–63.  
79 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 
(1945).  
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collective efforts of dozens or even hundreds of individuals who revise and 
edit works over the course of months or years, often independently of one 
another (sometimes unwittingly, as in our next example), passing around 
drafts until the work reaches a final fixed form. In other words, creative 
crowdsourcing has taken place since time immemorial even though the 
process occurred organically and without an entity or individual 
intentionally mining the creativity of the crowd. 
The Serenity Prayer provides a powerful example of this heretofore 
underappreciated process in action. While using Google Books as well as 
several other digital archives, Yale Law School librarian Fred Shapiro 
recently discovered that the most famous piece of liturgy in the twentieth 
century80 may not have been authored by the man who has historically 
received credit for the text, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.81 Shapiro 
uncovered various versions of The Serenity Prayer’s text published and in 
use as early as 1936—at least five years before Niebuhr had apparently 
claimed its creation.82 As Shapiro speculates, Niebuhr may have 
subconsciously adopted the prayer as his own after having come into 
contact with prior incarnations.83 Indeed, Shapiro’s work led to the 
unearthing of a number of prior versions of the Prayer that existed before 
the date of Niebuhr’s ostensible creation, when the Prayer took “final” and 
“official” form. Like different versions of an edited page on Wikipedia, 
these iterations of the Prayer gradually evolved into the precise verbiage 
and format of the final product that we know today: “God grant me the 
serenity to accept / the things I cannot change, / courage to change the 
things I can, / and wisdom to know the difference.”84 As such, Shapiro’s 
new evidence suggests that the work was collective in nature and that it 
was crowdsourced in voluntary, educational, and religious circles for a 
number of years before being popularly attributed to Niebuhr.85 
 
80 Fred R. Shapiro, Who Wrote the Serenity Prayer?, YALE ALUMNI MAG., July–Aug. 2008, at 34–
35, 37, available at http://archives.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2008_07/serenity.html [http://
perma.cc/6C8L-6WPY]. 
81 Id. at 35. 
82 Id. at 35, 37–38. Interestingly, the prior versions of the Prayer unearthed by Shapiro were by 
women, most of whom were involved in some sort of volunteer and educational activity. Elisabeth 
Sifton, It Takes a Master to Make a Masterpiece, YALE ALUMNI MAG., July–Aug. 2008, at 40, 
available at http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/3416 [http://perma.cc/L6LN-GKFK].  
83 Shapiro, supra note 80, at 39. Elisabeth Sifton, Niebuhr’s daughter, has adamantly denied 
Shapiro’s allegations. In an intervention entitled It Takes a Master to Make a Masterpiece, she argues, 
among other things, that the prayer must have come from a gifted practitioner from a particular 
theological context who could have only been her father. Sifton, supra note 82, at 40–41. Interestingly, 
the title of her article immediately plays into our most romantic notions of authorship, which seek to 
reduce creation to a lone genius rather than to the iterative and accretive contributions of many. 
84 See WILLIAM V. PIETSCH, THE SERENITY PRAYER BOOK (1992). 
85 In 2009, Duke researcher Stephen Goranson found a citation to Niebuhr as the Prayer’s author 
contained in a Christian student newsletter published in 1937. Laurie Goodstein, Serenity Prayer 
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Thus, crowdsourcing creation is not a new phenomenon. However, it 
has long gone unnoticed and unappreciated. In part, the romantic 
mythology surrounding Western notions of authors (as in the case of 
Niebuhr and The Serenity Prayer) has deemphasized the existence of 
crowdsourcing. In addition, the reality of crowdsourcing complicates 
authorship issues and legal rights.86 And since the operation of 
crowdsourcing in the past has occurred over the course of many years and 
in relative obscurity (often times even accidentally and without coordinated 
effort), it has not received much attention. However, with the speed and 
visibility of modern digital collaboration over networked technologies, 
crowdsourced creative activities are now everywhere we look, especially 
online. 
As with any transformative utilization of underlying creative materials, 
the act of creative crowdsourcing vindicates critical interests for both its 
participants and the public. To this end, it is worth focusing on two 
particular ends achieved by transformative activities. First, transformative 
uses advance the utilitarian goals of the copyright regime by giving the 
public new creative works imbued with original insights, meanings, and 
messages.87 Second, beyond merely serving the core function of the 
copyright regime, transformative interactions with creative works also 
advance identity formation and expressive interests by mediating the 
development of cultural networks, regulating or undermining insider–
outsider relationships, and demarcating or blurring social strata.88 
Specifically, our ability to make (or not make) transformative use of 
cultural content shapes identity formation, and our ability to exhibit or 
display publicly such uses impacts the way in which individuals can engage 
in semiotic use of cultural content and, thereby, express themselves to the 
world. 
As one of us has previously argued, identity formation takes place 
internally as an individual’s sense of self “is shaped through interaction 
 
Skeptic Now Credits Niebuhr, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, at A11. Shapiro responded that “[t]he new 
evidence does not prove that Reinhold Niebuhr wrote [The Serenity Prayer], but it does significantly 
improve the likelihood that he was the originator,” and that he would list The Serenity Prayer under 
Niebuhr’s name in the next edition of The Yale Book of Quotations. Id. 
86 For example, it raises issues of originality that might call into question the relatively low bar for 
copyrightability post-Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Id. 
at 346 (finding that the federal copyright regime’s originality requirement only necessitates 
“independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”). It may also lead to important questions about 
who might count as an author or joint author under 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).  
87 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he goal of 
copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works.”). 
88 See generally John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP 
(Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011).  
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with objects in the external world. . . . [T]he expression of personhood 
occurs when the individual communicates some aspect of her (already 
formed) identity to others as a way of contextualizing herself, through her 
relationship with objects, within the broader community.”89 These objects, 
of course, include those of an intangible nature, including the films, music, 
books, art, and television that comprise popular culture. Transformative 
interactions with creative works mediate the development of social 
relationships by allowing users to draw upon those creative works for 
expressive purposes, couching their interests or activities within a 
particular context—communicating their alignment with cultural, political, 
and economic networks and facilitating their interaction with the broader 
community.90 Expressive interaction with creative works also allows users 
to define their relationship with, and status in, their social milieu—be it 
oppositional or harmonious, insider or outsider. The creative choices users 
make when creating fan mash-ups, music remixes, or parodies of popular 
television shows or movies communicate important details about users’ 
perceived relationships with the world, their self-images, and their links to 
certain social, cultural, or political networks.91 A musical parody of 
Disney’s wildly popular Frozen film called “Fuck It All,” for instance, 
communicates a tongue-in-cheek disdain for the ubiquitous “Let It Go” and 
positions the creator of the parody as outside of the mainstream audience 
for the film,92 whereas a more traditional, homage-style Breaking Bad 
remix video may announce that its creators see themselves as in-the-know 
cultural insiders.93 
Transformative interactions with creative works also serve personhood 
interests by serving to demarcate or blur social boundaries. Where class 
lines were once easily defined and perceived by tangible property markers 
such as cars, homes, or brand of jeans, the explosion of technologies that 
gives users access to creative content online can have either subversive 
consequences by neutralizing those boundaries, or hegemonic 
consequences by giving new means to solidifying those boundaries. On the 
former point, for example, the advancement of identity formation and 
expressive interests through transformation of creative works, instead of 
through the conspicuous consumption of days past, can unshackle users 
from the constraints of their pocketbooks and can free them to express 
themselves to limits defined only by their creativity and imagination. 
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 30.  
91 Id. at 31. 
92 Iodine Cerium, Fuck It All – Parody of Let It Go, YOUTUBE (Jan. 11, 2014), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DlZdZYLCfU [http://perma.cc/VV8K-8Q2G]. 
93 Mc GillaCutty, Breaking Bad Remix (Seasons 1 and 2), YOUTUBE (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2yd9vW_lfsk [http://perma.cc/QSF9-SNXS]. 
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Contributing a scene to Star Wars: Uncut, for instance, announces 
alignment with the global Star Wars fan community—income or social 
strata be damned. People once separated by class (or race, age, or gender) 
can now forge connections through collaborative creative efforts that 
transcend those categories. On the latter point, limiting the ability of users 
to engage in transformative uses of certain creative works can create a 
world of expressive “haves” and “have-nots” and can further perpetuate 
existing social hierarchies by determining who, for example, might be able 
to make meaningful use of important patriotic or cultural symbols and to 
what end.94 
Thus, ordinary transformative works advance both the constitutionally 
mandated goal of the copyright regime—progress in the arts—and the 
expressive and personhood interests of the individuals who create and 
consume them. Critically, for the purposes of our analysis, crowdsourced 
transformative works have the potential to provide even further benefits 
along both lines. 
First, crowdsourced transformative activity may result in particular 
types of creative output that ordinary transformative activity is unlikely to 
produce. Thus, crowdsourced transformative activity fuels progress in the 
arts. After all, by accessing the knowledge, cultural experiences, and 
perspectives of hundreds (if not hundreds of thousands) of individuals, 
crowdsourcing has the unique ability to harness the strength of collective 
wisdom and insight. This can result in a final creation that draws on 
elements of which any one author (or group of authors who exist in a 
common social circle) would be unable, or at least unlikely, to make use. 
In the parlance of documentarian Kirby Ferguson, who wrote and 
directed the powerful and poignant Everything Is a Remix series, creative 
evolution is—like physical evolution—a process of copying, transforming, 
and combining,95 except instead of genes, the raw materials for creative 
evolution are memes.96 Crowdsourcing enables the copying, 
transformation, and combination of memes in a unique manner. It speeds 
up cultural evolution and also enables the creation of unknown blends and 
fusions. This mixing and remixing of cultural memes from around the 
globe is a dynamic amalgamating process that spurs innovation by giving 
rise to new forms of creativity. 
 
94 Tehranian, supra note 88, at 33–56 (using the examples of intellectual property rights to flags, 
the term “Olympic,” and songs associated with cultural heritage and pride to illustrate how referential, 
reverential, and subversive uses of creative works can impact insider–outsider boundaries within 
mainstream society and perpetuate or attack social hierarchies). 
95 Kirby Ferguson, Everything Is a Remix Part 4: System Failure, EVERYTHING IS A REMIX (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://everythingisaremix.info/blog/everything-is-a-remix-part-4 [http://perma.cc/K2TX-
669J]. 
96 Id.  
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Wikipedia exemplifies the ability of crowdsourcing to yield 
remarkable results from the proper harnessing of collective knowledge.97 
Indeed, by some measures, Wikipedia is nearly as factually accurate as 
such traditional repositories of knowledge as the Encyclopedia Britannica, 
and the two services achieve similar accuracy marks for serious errors.98 
And it does so while remaining more nimble and timely than the laudable 
encyclopedias of yore.99 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, unlike the 
learned tomes of the twentieth century, it is readily and freely accessible by 
anyone. 
Second, crowdsourced creative activities vindicate particularly unique 
expressive interests. The process of creating crowdsourced works often 
involves collaboration across the world through networked technologies, 
which allows individuals to engage with new technologies in a highly 
collaborative manner. It also enables those engaged in crowdsourcing to 
create at speeds never before possible. Casey Pugh, the creator of Star 
Wars: Uncut, said that one of the motivations for engaging in the project 
was to ascertain how fast he could make an entire film through 
crowdsourcing.100 It took him only nine to ten months to get all of the 
scenes he needed to put the film together101 and, by all accounts, the time 
taken to get the scenes together for his current project, The Empire Strikes 
 
97 Admittedly, Wikipedia represents more of an example of functional, rather than expressive, 
crowdsourcing. Nevertheless, the benefits it exemplifies from the harnessing of collective experiences 
and perspectives can advantage progress in the creative realm as well. 
98 See Daniel Terdiman, Study: Wikipedia as Accurate as Britannica, CNET NEWS (Dec. 15, 2005, 
3:35 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Study-Wikipedia-as-accurate-as-Britannica/2100-1038_3-5997332.
html [http://perma.cc/L5VJ-WXNQ] (citing a peer-review–expert study in Nature comparing side-by-
side entries in Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica on a variety of topics, and concluding that the 
two services achieve similar accuracy marks); see also Tim Worstall, It’s an Interesting World Where 
Wikipedia Is More Accurate than Both the CIA and the Wall Street Journal, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2013, 
5:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/12/06/its-an-interesting-world-where-wiki
pedia-is-more-accurate-than-both-the-cia-and-the-wall-street-journal/ [http://perma.cc/GA92-3XS3] 
(providing anecdotal evidence that Wikipedia’s use of statistical measurements of inequality and 
poverty is more accurate than the CIA and Wall Street Journal’s use thereof).  
99 But see Tom Simonite, The Decline of Wikipedia, MIT TECH. REV., Oct. 22, 2013, 
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520446/the-decline-of-wikipedia/ [http://perma.cc/
3U2D-UUWX] (critiquing Wikipedia for, inter alia, the 90% male demographic of its administrators, its 
“crushing bureaucracy,” its “abrasive atmosphere that deters newcomers,” and its “skewed coverage: its 
entries on Pokemon and female porn stars are comprehensive, but its pages on female novelists or 
places in sub-Saharan Africa are sketchy”).  
100 Lesley Coffin, Tribeca: Interview with Star Wars Uncut Creator Casey Pugh, FILMORIA (Apr. 
18, 2013), http://www.filmoria.co.uk/2013/04/tribeca-interview-with-star-wars-uncut-creator-casey-
pugh/ [http://perma.cc/5LH2-VL8B] (“I was also just interested in how fast I could remake a film using 
crowdsourcing.”). 
101 Id. (“[W]ithin [nine] or [ten] months, I got all the scenes and Star Wars Uncut was born.”). 
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Back: Uncut, was even less.102 Pugh is also now experimenting with 
crowdsourcing to make the viewing experience for his Empire Strikes Back 
project more interactive, allowing viewers to choose between versions of 
the scenes they want to experience.103 Thus, crowdsourced remixes not only 
offer new avenues for those providing creative inputs to a project, but also 
offer new ways for those experiencing the work to engage with what they 
see and hear. 
All told, crowdsourcing contributes to progress in the arts by 
encouraging the creation and dissemination of new artistic works. 
Meanwhile, it also vindicates important expressive interests. Yet, despite 
these seemingly positive virtues, crowdsourcing faces serious obstacles. 
While crowdsourcing is not a new phenomenon, it is now more visible and 
ubiquitous than ever before. And with its new high profile have come new 
legal challenges. The explosion of creative crowdsourcing activities raises 
serious copyright concerns and forces our legal regime on creative 
monopolies to address issues that were never fully anticipated by the 
Framers, let alone the drafters who gave us the (still reigning) Copyright 
Act of 1976. 
II. EXPRESSIVE CROWDSOURCING AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. Copyright Infringement 
Copyright law protects the rights of those who create literary, artistic, 
dramatic, and musical works.104 Its goal is to foster innovation in these 
areas by granting limited rights to authors to reap the commercial rewards 
of their efforts.105 Absent copyright law, others could reproduce and exploit 
 
102 Id. (“In less than a year, Star Wars Uncut was edited into a single, feature length remake of Star 
Wars: A New Hope. A few years later he began work on The Empire Strikes Back Uncut and in a third 
of the time, every scene was complete.”). 
103 Id. (“What I ended up doing for A New Hope Uncut was what we call a director’s cut, where I 
literally hand picked scenes which I thought would make the most entertaining final cut of the project. 
We have a liking system online, but even that wasn’t always the best way. And there are multiple 
versions with different scenes in each version. For The Empire Strikes Back Uncut, we will be releasing 
some new ways to watch different versions as well.”). 
104 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 2 (“[T]he first copyright act gave authors the exclusive right to 
make copies of their books. Today, copyright law covers much broader ground, including not only most 
artistic, literary, and musical works, but computer software and some kinds of databases as well.”). 
105 Id. at 21–22 (“Without specifying the form of protection, art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 of the United States 
Constitution empowers Congress to legislate copyright and patent statutes, conferring a limited 
monopoly on writings and inventions. By implication, the Constitution recognizes that copyright law 
plays an important role in our market economy. Rather than encouraging production of works by 
government subsidy, or awards or prizes, the author is given, through the limited monopoly of 
copyright law, a private property right over his creation, the worth of which will ultimately be 
determined by the market. The underlying policy of this constitutional provision is to promote the 
public welfare through private market incentives.”). 
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the works of a creator without recompense. Under the Copyright Act, a 
copyright owner—who may or may not be the author of the work—is 
granted a number of exclusive rights.106 These rights include the right to 
reproduce the work and the right to make derivative works based on the 
original work. Copyright holders are also granted the exclusive rights to 
distribute protected works to the public, to publicly display the works, and 
to engage in public performances of relevant works. These rights are 
tempered by several defenses, the most relevant for the purposes of this 
discussion being the fair use defense.107 
All of these rights may be implicated in expressive crowdsourced 
remixes both in terms of their inputs and their output. If the inputs to a 
Harry Potter fan video remix are film and music clips from the movies, 
and perhaps from some other sources, most if not all of the inputs will be 
copyrighted. When individuals contribute parts of existing works into a 
creative crowdsourced project, each individual will be reproducing the 
relevant segment of the work, and potentially contravening the copyright 
holder’s reproduction right. 
To the extent that the project organizers also make copies of those 
segments, they may additionally infringe the reproduction right. Further, 
they may be infringing the copyright holder’s derivative works right. 
Where the crowdsourced work is effectively a digital collage based on 
Harry Potter or some other particular protected work, the resulting product 
is likely a derivative work. Other common examples of derivative works 
include unauthorized prequels and sequels based on popular books or 
movies.108 
One salient difference between a crowdsourced digital remix and a 
more traditional derivative work (like a prequel or sequel) is that the remix 
is less likely to be for commercial profit and is less likely to occupy a 
market space that the copyright holder would exploit. Whereas one might 
argue that the market for sequels and prequels should be reserved to the 
copyright holder as a logical extension of its original market, the same is 
less true for most remixes, at least those of a noncommercial nature. 
The copyright holder’s exclusive public performance and distribution 
rights might also be implicated by remixing activities. In the digital age, 
courts have held that disseminating copyrighted works online may, 
depending on the circumstances, amount to a public performance,109 public 
 
106 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
107 Id. § 107. 
108 See Jacqueline D. Lipton, A Taxonomy of Borrowing, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 951, 980 (2014).  
109 See, e.g., On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991) (holding that a system for the electronic delivery of movies via video to hotel guests in 
different rooms in a hotel was a public performance). 
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display,110 or a distribution to the public.111 Thus, when remixers post their 
creations online, they are arguably displaying, distributing, or publicly 
performing those works under broad judicial interpretations of these terms. 
Individual contributors to a crowdsourced remix likely do not infringe 
these particular rights if they simply send their input directly to the 
organizer of the remix. A private communication of a copyrighted work 
may infringe the reproduction right to the extent that it involves a digital 
copy being made of the work during the transmission process, but it is 
unlikely to be regarded as sufficiently “public” to infringe these other 
rights. 
B. Creative Crowdsourcing: The Trouble with Several Arguments Against 
Infringement Under Current Law 
Multiple arguments have been made, mostly unsuccessfully, in favor 
of limiting liability for remixers. For example, one might argue that the 
uses of existing works by remixers are simply de minimis. One might also 
think that no copyright holder would ever sue—or threaten to sue—over 
these kinds of uses, or that a plaintiff could never establish sufficient harm 
to sway a court to grant a remedy. However, evidence suggests that 
copyright holders often sue or threaten to sue individuals for apparently 
nonharmful, noncommercial uses of their works.112 They regularly issue 
takedown notices to popular media-sharing sites such as YouTube.113 This 
effectively puts the onus on the alleged infringer to prove a defense, such 
as fair use, before the fact. Although fair use is a complete defense to a 
copyright infringement claim, it is very difficult for an individual with 
limited resources and limited knowledge of copyright law to establish fair 
use outside the litigation context. Even within the litigation context, the 
burden of proving fair use falls squarely on the defendant,114 and it is a 
 
110 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556–57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that 
a computer bulletin board operator may be held liable for displaying a work to the public where the 
work was originally posted on the bulletin board by a third party; the display is regarded as being 
“public” even if only a limited number of bulletin board subscribers can access it). 
111 Id. at 1559. 
112 JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 99 (2011) (noting the 
onslaught of copyright suits brought by the Recording Industry Association of America against peer-to-
peer file sharers); id. at 149 (noting that thousands of individual music file sharers have faced suits 
brought by the Recording Industry Association of America and its members). 
113 Id. at 134–35 (describing the way in which content holders have issued takedown notices to 
YouTube in the most questionable cases of copyright infringement); id. at 135–36 (example of 
Universal’s use of a takedown notice, issued to YouTube, to have YouTube remove a home video of a 
small child dancing to Prince’s hit single “Let’s Go Crazy” on the basis of copyright infringement). 
114 Id. at 5 (“[F]air use is an affirmative defense. Although this fact makes little difference to 
theorists speaking about fair use in a vacuum, it makes a profound difference to copyright defendants 
facing the specter of multiple millions in liability in federal court as the doctrine places the burden 
squarely on the defendant to prove fair use.”). 
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burden few private individuals can bear in practice—often for reasons 
having nothing to do with the merits of the defense. 
Although remix artists’ uses of copyrighted materials may be seen as 
inconsequential, or at least as not causing any significant commercial harm 
to a copyright holder, courts have generally ignored arguments about de 
minimis uses in the copyright context.115 Additionally, copyright courts 
have, in general, broadly construed notions of commercial use and 
commercial harm to a copyright holder.116 
A second argument that has largely failed is that people who create fan 
remixes in the form of homage to, or parody of, the original work would 
never be sued because they would positively affect the copyright holder’s 
bottom line. In other words, much fan activity provides free publicity for 
copyright holders and should be welcomed or even encouraged. While 
many copyright holders encourage, welcome, or at least ignore fan works, 
others prefer to assert more absolute control over their works. For example, 
Summit Entertainment has been particularly proprietary about even de 
minimis fan uses of material from its popular Twilight film franchise.117 
Copyright holders may want to control all aspects of marketing and 
publicity themselves or may desire royalties for use of proprietary materials 
even where charging a royalty chills free publicity within the fan 
community. 
Another argument against infringement liability is that remixing is 
predominantly an expressive activity and that expressive uses of 
copyrighted works should receive protection under the First Amendment. 
However, in recent copyright jurisprudence, courts have held that the fair 
use defense provides the necessary balance between free speech and 
copyright.118 Thus, the First Amendment argument against copyright 
infringement is dealt with by saying that a defendant making an expressive 
use can rely on the fair use defense. For example, the Supreme Court 
 
115 Id. at 13 (“[A] de minimus-use [sic] defense is typically ignored by courts in copyright cases.”). 
116 Id. (“[C]ourts have frequently adopted broad readings of what constitutes commercial use.”); id. 
at 14 (“[O]ne could argue that virtually all use is commercial in nature because, at some level, any 
unpaid use of a copyrighted work causes someone to lose potential revenue.”).  
117 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 19, at 37–42. 
118 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“[C]opyright’s built-in free speech 
safeguards are generally adequate to address [any conflict with free speech rights].”); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (noting that copyright law needs no 
independent First Amendment scrutiny because it already incorporates such concerns through its 
“distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for 
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use”); L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 
795 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Copyright law incorporates First Amendment goals by ensuring that copyright 
protection extends only to the forms in which ideas and information are expressed and not to the ideas 
and information themselves.”); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 
1989) (“[T]he fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of [F]irst [A]mendment in the copyright field.”).  
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famously stated in Eldred v. Ashcroft that copyright is generally immunized 
from independent First Amendment scrutiny because it only restricts the 
ability of individuals to make “other people’s” speech, not their own.119 
Although the Supreme Court’s distinction between an individual’s 
own speech and the speech of others might make sense when read against 
copyright law as it existed at the time of the Framing—when it only 
prohibited direct, one-to-one copying of books and maps—the dichotomy 
has become less clear because copyright now protects derivative works. 
Whereas in some cases, there may be little doubt that an accused infringer 
is merely making another’s speech (as in Eldred, where the accused 
infringer adopted, word-for-word, the writings of others), there are a 
multitude of transformative instances where accused infringers combine the 
fruit of another’s intellectual labor with their own to create something new 
and original. For example, George Harrison was famously and successfully 
found liable for subconscious infringement when he purportedly usurped 
key elements from the Chiffons’ 1963 doo–wop hit “He’s So Fine” in 
composing his stately and saturnine spiritual “My Sweet Lord.”120 Yet there 
is little doubt that his composition contained strong elements of his speech, 
including his unique lyrical and musical sensibilities. Such uses as 
Harrison’s can and should muddy the notion of speech ownership. 
Nevertheless, as it stands, copyright claims generally enjoy immunity from 
independent First Amendment scrutiny.121 
Another potential argument against liability is that remixers are 
usually “innocent infringers”—that few remixers have any intention to 
infringe the copyrights of the underlying rights holders of the sampled 
works. Indeed, a brief survey of fan video mash-ups on YouTube suggests 
that many remixers assume this to be a legitimate defense: remixers who 
reuse copyright materials without permission often affix notices to their 
mash-ups stating that no infringement was intended.122 Presumably, 
remixers have done this to negate a claim of copyright infringement, on the 
mistaken assumption that a copyright infringement action includes a mens 
rea requirement.123 
 
119 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg pronounced that “[t]he First Amendment securely 
protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when 
speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added). 
The Court then confidently asserted that copyright law’s built-in checks—rather than heightened 
constitutional scrutiny—could generally solve any potential free speech issues. Id. 
120 See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 178–79 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (demonstrating the musical similarities between the two motifs), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, 
Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).  
121 But see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001). 
122 Lipton, supra note 19, at 22–23. 
123 Id. at 23. 
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Most remixers—in fact, most people who are not copyright lawyers—
do not realize that copyright infringement attaches strict liability.124 There is 
no mens rea requirement for infringement.125 Thus, even an individual with 
no intent to infringe may be liable for direct infringement if she performed 
any of the acts reserved to the copyright holder. The affixation of a notice 
to a work asserting that “no infringement was intended” is irrelevant to 
liability. The question, therefore, becomes whether the law, as it currently 
stands, is striking an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright 
holders and those of creative and expressive users who do not intend to 
compete with the copyright holders. The answer appears to be no because 
with First Amendment and innocent infringement defenses unavailing,126 
artists are left to seek salvation in the fair use doctrine. Unfortunately, such 
reliance is all too often unhelpful. 
C. Remixing and Fair Use 
As noted in the previous Section, many have argued that fair use is the 
solution to concerns about overzealous enforcement of copyrights.127 
Because fair use is touted as the answer to First Amendment concerns, it 
bears detailed scrutiny in the remixing context. However, the application of 
the fair use defense is problematic in practice largely because of its 
unpredictability and because it can be used only as a sword and not a 
shield. In other words, fair use can be raised only as a defense in an 
infringement action.128 It cannot be effectively established outside this 
 
124 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 13 (“[C]opyright law is a strict liability regime with no mens rea 
requirement for liability. Infringement occurs whether an individual acts with bad faith or complete 
innocence.”). 
125 Id. 
126 Innocent state of mind does not ever impact the liability calculus, but it can impact damages 
awards. See, e.g., D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A] finding of 
innocent infringement does not absolve the defendant of liability under the Copyright Act. Rather, it 
triggers an equitable remedy that affords the district court discretion to award damages commensurate 
with the defendant’s culpability.” (citation omitted)). Actual damages are not mitigated in any way by a 
defense of innocent infringement, but statutory damages can be. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012); 
Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Even an innocent 
infringer is liable for infringement. . . . Innocence is only significant to a trial court when it fixes 
statutory damages, which is a remedy equitable in nature.”); see also R. Anthony Reese, Innocent 
Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 182–83 (2007) (noting 
the declining value of the innocent infringement defense through the course of American copyright 
history). 
127 See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“Because of the First Amendment principles built into copyright law through the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use, courts often need not entertain related First Amendment 
arguments in a copyright case.”). 
128 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Fair use is an affirmative defense, so doubts about whether a given use is fair should not 
be resolved in favor of the self-proclaimed parodist. We should not make it easy for musicians to 
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context. In addition, fair use jurisprudence has provided enough 
unfavorable precedent against remixing activities that a well-financed 
rights holder can make colorable, if not ultimately winning, infringement 
claims against remixing defendants. 
The fair use defense was initially developed through case law as an 
equitable rule of reason that could be adapted to new fact scenarios.129 It 
retained this flexible quality when Congress incorporated it into the 1976 
Copyright Act. As legislatively enacted, the defense provides courts with a 
list of at least four interests they must balance in any given case, but it 
provides little additional guidance. In practice, this gives rise to great ex 
ante uncertainty about the outcome of a fair use defense. 
The text of the defense appears in § 107 of the Copyright Act and 
provides that: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include— 
 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
 (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.130 
Section 107 sets out examples of particular activities—such as 
criticism, comment, teaching, scholarship, and research—that are typically 
regarded as fair use. However, the statute does not demand that a court 
deem such uses fair. Instead, it simply provides examples of the types of 
practices that past cases may have excused from liability under the fair use 
doctrine. As it turns out, courts have frequently denied fair use defenses for 
some of the examples seemingly contained in the statute itself, including 
news reporting, classroom photocopying, and research.131 For example, in 
 
exploit existing works and then later claim that their rendition was a valuable commentary on the 
original.”). 
129 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 487 (“The doctrine of fair use is a judicially created defense to 
copyright infringement that allows a third party to use a copyrighted work in a reasonable manner 
without the copyright owner’s consent. Although codified in the 1976 Act, the doctrine of fair use has 
retained its nature as an equitable rule of reason to be applied where a finding of infringement would 
either be unfair or undermine ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’”). 
130 § 107. 
131 Id. 
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Los Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected a fair use defense brought by a television news broadcast that used 
thirty seconds of a four-minute video capturing the infamous beating of 
Reginald Denny in Los Angeles in 1992.132 Other circuit courts have not 
hesitated to reject fair use defenses for the photocopying of copyrighted 
materials for classroom133 or scientific research purposes.134 Meanwhile, to 
add to the ambiguity, the case law is clear that none of the four fair use 
factors listed in § 107 are necessarily determinative in any given case. 
Indeed, the factors may be weighted differently from case to case and from 
court to court.135 
Along with the flexibility in application of the fair use factors comes 
flexibility in interpretation of each factor. For example, as epitomized by 
the landmark Supreme Court case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, courts have 
imported a “transformative use” test into the first factor: the purpose or 
character of the defendant’s use.136 However, even the nature of 
transformative use is fluid in practice. Originally, a court was more likely 
to find fair use under the first factor where the defendant’s use was 
transformative in the sense of adding new meanings and perspectives to the 
plaintiff’s work.137 The most obvious and most often upheld type of fair use 
 
132 108 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1997). 
133 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(“This is a copyright infringement case. The corporate defendant, Michigan Document Services, Inc., is 
a commercial copyshop that reproduced substantial segments of copyrighted works of scholarship, 
bound the copies into ‘coursepacks,’ and sold the coursepacks to students for use in fulfilling reading 
assignments given by professors at the University of Michigan. The copyshop acted without permission 
from the copyright holders . . . .”). But the digital world is different. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. 
Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012); J.D. Lipton, Copyright, Plagiarism, and Emerging 
Norms in Digital Publishing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 585 (2014). 
134 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), amended by 60 F.3d 913 
(2d Cir. 1994). However, digitization of library materials has recently been allowed in several cases as a 
fair use with reference to the ease of access and use for scientific and research purposes, amongst other 
issues. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
Hathitrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 2013 WL 603193 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013). 
135 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 488 (“[T]he fair use defense continues to defy precise definition and 
remains an ad hoc equitable rule of reason where finding an infringement would undermine the ultimate 
purpose of copyright law.”).  
136 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 40 (noting that this test was imported from Judge Pierre Leval’s 
article, Toward a Fair Use Standard, and that Judge Leval, in this article, advocated making 
transformative use the focus of the first factor of the fair use test); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a 
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1990).  
137 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 156 (noting the Supreme Court’s reigning definition of 
“transformative use” as holding that a work “is transformative if it ‘adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message’” 
(alteration in original)). 
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in this regard has been parody of, and sometimes other forms of 
commentary on, an original work.138 
More recently, however, courts have started using the transformative 
use test in a different way, focusing not just on transexpressive uses but 
also on transpurposive ones (i.e., the new functional aspects of the 
defendant’s use). Thus, courts have held that a defendant makes a 
transformative use of the plaintiff’s work in cases where the defendant’s 
use does not add any new insights to the work, but rather presents it in a 
new technological or functional context.139 For example, courts have held 
that directly reproducing a graphical work as a thumbnail image in image 
search results is a fair use even though the search engines’ reproductions of 
the plaintiffs’ images in and of themselves added no new insights to the 
works in question.140 The same results have been obtained even more 
recently in cases involving the digitization of materials for full text 
searches in libraries and for digitized university coursepacks.141 While the 
material itself was not transformed, the new uses to which they were put 
were regarded by the court as functionally transformative with respect to 
the first factor of the fair use test.142 
Other vagaries of the first fair use factor relate to its invitation to a 
court to consider whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work “is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”143 One 
obvious problem with this approach is that many kinds of uses will fall 
 
138 Id. at 40 (“[F]air use has consistently favored criticism and parody over other transformative 
uses. Thus, with the exception of parody, cases have repeatedly demonstrated that the slightest 
appropriation of a copyrighted work will result in a finding of infringement . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
139 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although Arriba made 
exact replications of Kelly’s images, the thumbnails were much smaller, lower-resolution images that 
served an entirely different function than Kelly’s original images. Kelly’s images are artistic works 
intended to inform and to engage the viewer in an aesthetic experience. His images are used to portray 
scenes from the American West in an aesthetic manner. Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images in the 
thumbnails is unrelated to any aesthetic purpose. Arriba’s search engine functions as a tool to help 
index and improve access to images on the internet and their related web sites.”); Authors Guild, 954 F. 
Supp. 2d at 291 (“Google’s use of the copyrighted works is highly transformative. Google Books 
digitizes books and transforms expressive text into a comprehensive word index that helps readers, 
scholars, researchers, and others find books. Google Books has become an important tool for libraries 
and librarians and cite-checkers as it helps to identify and find books. The use of book text to facilitate 
search through the display of snippets is transformative.”); see also Lipton, supra note 108, at 973. 
140 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The fact that 
Google incorporates the entire Perfect 10 image into the search engine results does not diminish the 
transformative nature of Google’s use. As the district court correctly noted, we determined in Kelly that 
even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a different 
function than the original work.” (citation omitted)); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818–20.  
141 Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 282; Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 
2013 WL 603193 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013); see also Lipton, supra note 108, at 974. 
142 Lipton, supra note 108, at 974. 
143 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
414 
somewhere in between “commercial use” and “nonprofit educational use.” 
Additionally, many educational uses can be regarded as commercial, given 
that education itself is increasingly a commercial enterprise. The defense 
also does not contemplate nonprofit uses outside the educational context, 
perhaps implying that a noncommercial use that is not educational is less 
likely to be regarded as a fair use than a noncommercial use that is related 
to education. 
Even restricting the inquiry to the definition of commercial use has 
proved problematic in practice. There are many different ways to define the 
term. Courts have not established any consistent guidelines on the 
definition.144 In many recent cases, courts have generally erred on the side 
of finding a commercial use.145 This has not been a difficult task given that 
almost any use not authorized or paid for could be regarded as having 
deprived someone of a royalty.146 To the extent that courts easily find 
commercial use under the first factor in contexts where the defendant has 
allegedly caused some kind of market harm, courts have also tended to 
conflate the first factor with the fourth.147 The fourth fair use factor requires 
courts to consider the impact of the defendant’s use on the potential market 
for or value of the work.148 Given the similarity of the issues that may be 
considered under the first and fourth factors, a court can often effectively 
“double count” or at least overemphasize elements of a defendant’s 
conduct that might implicate both factors. 
Given all of these uncertainties inherent in applying the first fair use 
factor, the challenges for creative remixing begin to come into sharp relief. 
Remixes may or may not be regarded as commentary or parody—the types 
of uses most typically protected under the first fair use factor. However, 
 
144 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 44 (“Finding a meaningful and consistent definition of 
commercial use has proved an elusive goal.”). 
145 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 496 (“Generally, if a challenged use of a copyrighted work is for 
commercial gain, a presumption against fair use arises.”); see, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that file sharing on the Internet constituted 
commercial activity because, even though no money was exchanged, users could act as “leeches” and 
download music from other people’s computers without reciprocating); Worldwide Church of God v. 
Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1113, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the giving away 
of thirty thousand free copies of a religious work constituted commercial activity because the defendant 
“profited” from the use of the work by attracting new members who might ultimately tithe to the 
church). As the Supreme Court has noted, “The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether 
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the 
copyrighted material without paying the customary price.” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
146 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 44 (“[F]air use always causes some loss in potential revenue to 
someone.”).  
147 Id. (“To the extent market harm is an appropriate consideration, it is already covered by the 
fourth factor in the fair use test and need not be redundantly considered in the first factor as well.”). 
148 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
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even though a use is not a parody, it may yet be expressive and 
meaningful.149 
Many crowdsourced fan projects will not have any obvious 
commercial purpose. One might therefore think that they would be more 
likely to be protected as fair use under the first factor. However, there is a 
risk that, in some cases of creative crowdsourcing, a commercial aspect 
will become incidentally incorporated into the work when it is distributed 
online. For example, video mash-ups on YouTube and other similar video-
sharing services150 may attract advertising revenues and hence be regarded 
as a commercial use on that basis. Even where there is no advertising, the 
possibility of future advertising revenues may be enough to convince a 
court of a commercial use. As an alternative, a video hosting website may 
charge fees for access or may have the potential to charge fees in the future, 
again potentially satisfying the commercial use element of fair use. Finally, 
in some cases, a crowdsourced project may itself attract such a consumer 
following that it is potentially commercializable in its own right. This 
might (sometimes unwittingly) establish a potential commercial use or 
market harm under the first or fourth factors. 
The second fair use factor—the nature of the copyrighted work151—is 
unlikely to prove particularly useful for those engaging in creative 
crowdsourcing. This factor will frequently cut against crowdsourced 
projects in which inputs are themselves copies of segments of creative 
works, such as movie and music clips. The second fair use factor generally 
grants greater protection to works that lie at the heart of creative innovation 
than more functional works such as computer software or informational 
works.152 Where the works in question are movies and music, the second 
factor will often favor the plaintiff. 
The third fair use factor—the amount and substantiality of the portion 
of the work used153—could help or hurt a creative crowdsourced project. 
While some video mash-ups, for example, will be much shorter than the 
works from which they are taken, the third factor might still cut against the 
 
149 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 42 (“As many appropriationist artists have demonstrated, 
something new, expressive, and meaningful can emerge from the combination or alteration of 
copyrighted works of the past.”). 
150 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 62, at 351 (defining “video-sharing services” as “Websites, 
such as YouTube and Metacafe, that allow users to upload video files, including video clips from 
popular movies and TV shows as well as original footage”). 
151 § 107(2). 
152 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 497 (“The second [fair use] factor reflects the view that to support 
the public interest greater access should be allowed to some kinds of works than others. Because the 
ultimate goal of copyright law is to increase our fund of information, the fair use privilege is more 
extensive for works of information such as scientific, biographical, or historical works than for works of 
entertainment.”). 
153 § 107(3). 
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crowdsourced project because the factor is not concerned only with 
quantity.154 Courts have interpreted the amount and substantiality inquiry as 
focusing on what is being taken from an underlying work, not how 
significant that use is to the allegedly infringing work.155 Furthermore, if 
only a small portion of a work is copied, a court may nevertheless hold that 
the taking is qualitatively substantial under the third fair use factor.156 For 
example, courts have held that copying the key points of a literary work 
may infringe copyright even if the defendant has not copied a large 
quantity of the text.157 
There are few clear ex ante guidelines as to what kinds of borrowing a 
court would consider qualitatively substantial under the third fair use 
factor. Even a five-minute fan mash-up may run afoul of the third fair use 
factor if a court holds that what has been taken by the defendant is 
qualitatively significant. In the case of a longer crowdsourced project like 
Star Wars: Uncut, the amount taken by the defendants may be regarded as 
both quantitatively and qualitatively substantial under the third factor. 
Some examples might be the Johnny Finder video games, which, to a 
significant extent, follow the characters and storylines of several Indiana 
Jones movies. 
In sum, both adverse precedent and its unpredictable nature combine 
to make the fair use defense not useful to those seeking to engage in 
creative projects by using existing copyrighted works as inputs. Further, the 
time and cost burdens associated with litigation may deter many potential 
defendants from pursuing a fair use argument. They may instead simply 
cease their activities if a copyright holder complains. There is also no 
accurate way of counting the number of projects that are never commenced 
in the first place for fear of copyright liability. 
Again, we are not arguing that copyright protection is unimportant or 
that those who develop valuable commercial properties should not be 
entitled to protect their markets. Rather, our concern is where the 
 
154 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 500 (“Questions of amount and substantiality [under the third fair 
use factor] have a qualitative, as well as quantitative, dimension. Even small takings can exceed fair use 
when the essence of the work is taken.” (footnote omitted)). 
155 See, e.g., § 107(3) (weighing “the amount and substantiality of the portion [of the copyrighted 
work] used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (noting that the third fair use factor requires an analysis of both what was taken 
quantitatively and qualitatively from the copyrighted work); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. 
Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the third fair use factor weighed in 
favor of defendants because the use of screen shot from a video game constitutes the usurping of only a 
tiny fraction of substance from the copyrighted work).  
156 Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(finding that use of copyrighted Charlie Chaplin movies that may have been qualitatively, though not 
quantitatively, great was sufficient to weigh the third factor against a finding of fair use). 
157 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).  
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boundaries of those markets should be set. Some of the appropriate 
boundaries are obvious: for example, few would argue in favor of large-
scale commercial pirating of movies and music. However, providing 
appropriate protections to copyright holders should not extend to every 
possible use of a work, especially where the use is not intended to be 
commercialized and does not appreciably damage the copyright holder’s 
bottom line. 
The following case study considers in more detail the Star Wars: 
Uncut project as an example of a creative crowdsourced derivative work. It 
examines the social benefits inherent in the work and the current 
uncertainties in ascertaining whether such works could be regarded as 
infringing copyrights. We argue that copyright law as currently drafted and 
enforced is unfortunately vague in its application to these kinds of projects. 
We advocate the development of clearer guidelines that would facilitate 
creative crowdsourcing in cases where the crowdsourced projects pose little 
realistic threat of commercial harm to copyright holders. 
It is important for the law to facilitate, rather than chill, creative 
crowdsourced projects because these projects promote important social 
goals and values. Much of what we say about Star Wars: Uncut will also 
apply to creative remixes that do not involve crowdsourcing. The potential 
to engage in expressive crowdsourcing of this kind, and on a global scale, 
is only now beginning to be tapped. Those who engage in these kinds of 
projects should be encouraged to communicate, collaborate, and play with 
available technologies for expressive and self-actualization purposes. 
D. Star Wars: Uncut: A Case Study in Crowdsourcing and Copyright 
1. The Value of Creative Crowdsourcing.—In 2009, Casey Pugh, a 
self-described “creative technolgist,”158 launched a project called Star 
Wars: Uncut.159 His aim was to combine his passion for creative 
crowdsourced technology with his passion for the Star Wars saga. The 
project was relatively simple in its conception: Pugh broke down the first 
released Star Wars film, Episode IV: A New Hope, into 473 individual 
fifteen-second video segments.160 He then put out an open call on his 
website for amateur filmmakers to choose a segment and film their own 
version of it.161 The segments were then submitted to him and his team for 
 
158 See CASEY PUGH, http://www.caseypugh.com [http://perma.cc/ZNS4-WV79].  
159 Brian Stelter, An Emmy for Rebuilding a Galaxy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/arts/television/28uncut.html [http://perma.cc/PS8J-5WD4]. 
160 Id. 
161 Casey Pugh et al.: Star Wars Uncut, AKSIOMA INST. FOR CONTEMP. ART, 
http://www.aksioma.org/star.wars.uncut/ [http://perma.cc/VYE3-94X8] (“Described as ‘the biggest fan 
remake of all time,’ Star Wars Uncut is a crazy fan [mash-up] remake of the original Star Wars movies. 
In 2009, Casey was inspired to use the Internet and an ever-ready pool of passionate Star Wars fans to 
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compilation into a full-length version of the original film told through the 
eyes of the amateur filmmakers.162 
There were no real rules about content other than that each 
contribution had to be faithful to the storyboarding of the relevant 
segment.163 This left individual contributors free to film cartoon versions, 
stop-motion versions, low budget home video versions, computer generated 
graphics versions, and even a few gender-bending versions of their 
segments with storm-troopers appearing in the form of armored women.164 
In one segment, a Jawa even appears in the guise of Homer Simpson. 
Pugh ultimately collated the chosen contributions into a full-length 
movie that he entitled Star Wars: Uncut. His film received significant 
media attention, ultimately garnering an Emmy award.165 This award 
established that a creative crowdsourced project could attain the status of a 
feature film in its own right despite the fact that it was not intended for 
commercial release. Pugh subsequently launched a similar project, for Star 
Wars Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back, at the Tribeca Film Festival in 
April 2013.166 
While creative crowdsourcing like Star Wars: Uncut bears some 
structural similarity to more functional crowdsourcing (such as Wikipedia), 
it provides quite different societal benefits. Functional crowdsourcing is 
generally aimed at increasing the store of human knowledge, while creative 
crowdsourcing applies the group mind in the artistic context to add to the 
store of human expression. Both functional and creative crowdsourcing 
enable individuals to communicate with each other across great distances 
and to play with new technologies to create something novel that is larger 
 
crowdsource the classic film Star Wars IV: A New Hope (1977). The original movie has been split in 
480 scenes of [fifteen] seconds each, and Internet users and Star Wars fans have been invited to claim a 
scene and to make a remake within [thirty] days. Each scene could be recreated in any possible way: 
live action, homemade re-enactment, stop motion, flipbooks, action figures, 3D animation, animated 
ASCII art, etc. Once all 480 scenes were claimed, all the scenes have been unlocked again so that more 
people could participate. About a thousand fans from 300 countries all around the world took part in the 
process, and all the scenes are available online on the project’s website and on YouTube.”). 
162 Id. 
163 Daniel Rubinton, Interview: Casey Pugh, “Star Wars Uncut,” FILM SOC’Y OF LINCOLN CENTER 
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.filmlinc.com/daily/entry/interview-with-casey-pugh-star-wars-uncut 
[http://perma.cc/QB9C-EE52] (“I told all the contributors to be as creative as possible when recreating 
their scenes.”). 
164 FAQ – Empire Uncut, STAR WARS UNCUT, http://www.starwarsuncut.com/faq 
[http://perma.cc/6XF4-HGAC] (“You can re-create your scene however you want: live action, stop 
motion, flipbooks, action figures . . . animated ASCII art, whatever! The more creative, the better.”). 
165 Stelter, supra note 159.  
166 See Empire Uncut, STAR WARS UNCUT, http://www.starwarsuncut.com/empire 
[http://perma.cc/FE4Z-5DNA]; Karen Kemmerle, Casey Pugh on Star Wars Uncut, TRIBECA FILM 
FESTIVAL (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.tribecafilmfestival.org/stories/casey-pugh-starwars-uncut 
[http://perma.cc/G7MD-2672]. 
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than any individual contribution. However, the values inherent in creative 
crowdsourcing have more to do with self-expression than with exploring 
new scientific or functional capabilities of the new technologies. Creative 
crowdsourcing offers new opportunities for individuals to engage in 
expression about popular culture. However, in order to draw from popular 
culture, participants in creative crowdsourcing will likely run into some of 
the copyright concerns described above.167 
Creative crowdsourcing like Star Wars: Uncut provides opportunities 
for society to experience aspects of popular culture in new ways. Remixes 
and mash-ups are likely to contain new insights into their component 
original works by way of parody, commentary, or the simple adding of new 
perspectives. Remixing popular culture enables viewers to experience 
myriad different artistic perspectives relating to an underlying work. 
Segments involving female stormtroopers, for example, create a sense that 
some viewers were disappointed in the lack of female presence in the story, 
while segments that insert, say, Simpsons characters, suggest the potential 
to laugh at aspects of the original film. 
Crowdsourced remixes achieve this potential on a large scale, 
incorporating many different voices by way of creative inputs.168 These 
projects involve the opportunity to create new meanings and perspectives 
on a work by juxtaposing different interpretations within a collective body. 
The ability to express and experience views on matters of popular culture is 
an important aspect of personhood. Individuals in a free society need space 
to explore ideas about the cultural fabric surrounding them.169 People must 
have the ability to access and use popular cultural icons for their own self-
expression as both consumers and creators. 
The right of publicity is an area of law where commentators, courts, 
and legislators have increasingly recognized the importance of access to 
cultural icons. Commentators have identified conflicts between creative 
play with cultural icons, on the one hand, and the protection of economic 
intellectual property rights on the other.170 With respect to the theoretically 
ambiguous right of publicity,171 for example, scholars have expressed 
concern that if the right becomes too proprietary, it will negatively affect 
 
167 See supra Part II.C. 
168 See supra Part II.C. 
169 See supra Part II.C.; see also Tushnet, supra note 15, at 655–58. 
170 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 685–86 (“[F]andom demonstrates that unlimited economic incentives 
to create in the form of expansive intellectual property protection are unnecessary to spur productivity 
and may even inhibit it. Creative activity has inherent satisfactions; economic gain is not the only 
motivation for creators. Purely market-oriented theories of copyright disregard the inherent power of 
storytelling.”).  
171 LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 43–45 (explaining the nature and genesis of the state right of 
publicity tort). 
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the ability of the public to engage in important speech about cultural 
icons.172 Commentators have noted the complex relationship between 
public icons and the public at large, noting that icons use the media and the 
public to develop a commercially valuable persona.173 They have also 
observed the absorption of public icons into the fabric of cultural discourse, 
and the importance of individuals having ready access to those icons for 
expressive purposes.174 The law governing the use of celebrity likenesses—
the right of publicity—has made dramatic strides in recent years to account 
for the public interest in unauthorized and uncompensated transformative 
use of such icons for expressive purposes.175 However, copyright has not 
enjoyed such a dramatic evolution.176 
Copyright law raises similar challenges in balancing incentives to 
create allowances for expressive discourse. The more absolute control 
afforded to content owners, the less popular material will be available for 
creative play. However, allowing unbridled access to, and use of, protected 
works potentially risks negatively impacting incentives to create in the first 
place.177 Of course, even this discussion of balancing creative play against 
commercial interests is an oversimplification on a number of levels. Many 
who start out playing creatively with the raw materials of popular culture 
end up making a living out of their work.178 However, the law currently 
 
172 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 
81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 134 (1993) (“[P]ublicity rights exact a higher cost in important competing 
values (notably, free expression and cultural pluralism) than has generally been appreciated.”); id. at 
138 (“[P]ublicity rights facilitate private censorship of popular culture.”). 
173 Id. at 193–94 (“However strenuously the star may fight the intertextuality of his image, however 
scrupulously he may try to monitor and shape it, the media and the public always play a substantial part 
in the image-making process. True, audiences cannot make media images mean anything they want to, 
but they can (and do) select from the complexity of the image the meanings and feelings, the variations, 
inflections and contradictions, that work for them. It is not just that the audience, by giving the public 
figure cues as to what it is it wants from him, helps to determine the particular image he seeks to create 
and project.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
174 Id. at 239 (“[P]roperty rights in our culture’s basic linguistic, symbolic, and discursive raw 
materials should not be created unless a clear and convincing showing is made that very substantial 
social interests will thereby be served. . . . [N]o such showing has yet been made with respect to star 
images. The proponents of publicity rights still have work to do to persuade us why these images should 
not be treated as part of our cultural commons, freely available for use in the creation of new cultural 
meanings and social identities, as well as new economic values.”). 
175 Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free 
Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2013) (comparing the vast difference in expressive defenses 
in copyright law versus in right of publicity law, especially as evidenced by the transformative use 
defense developed for right of publicity claims in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 
21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)). 
176 Id. 
177 See, e.g., LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 490 (suggesting that the point of the fair use defense is to 
protect uses that are not so excessive as to undermine the production of copyrighted works). 
178 Lipton, supra note 108, at 983. 
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does not sufficiently recognize the benefits of remixing, and, therefore, the 
balancing of incentives is skewed too much in favor of copyright holders. 
2. Copyright Infringement, Fair Use, and Star Wars: Uncut.—The 
example of Star Wars: Uncut helps elucidate some of the challenges for 
modern copyright law. One reason why Star Wars: Uncut is a useful case 
study is that the copyright holder in question was originally Lucasfilm, 
which had developed a sophisticated relationship with its fans in respect to 
derivative fan works before being sold to Disney. The case study is useful 
to this discussion because it is one of the most high profile examples of 
creative crowdsourcing in popular arts and entertainment. Additionally, it 
raises the specter of what may happen when corporate control of the 
foundational work (the Star Wars films in this case) changes hands from a 
company initially permissive about crowdsourced secondary works in 
principle to a company that is historically more proprietary about its 
valuable copyrighted properties. In other words, when Lucasfilm was sold 
to Disney, there was some concern that the sale would negatively impact 
the kinds of fan activities that had previously been tolerated, and even 
encouraged, by Lucasfilm.179 Before its sale to Disney, Lucasfilm retained 
tight control over the commercialization of its properties, but it also 
encouraged fans to engage in noncommercial expressive activities using its 
works.180 Historically, Lucasfilm made its own copyrighted materials 
available to fans for noncommercial purposes,181 while retaining its rights to 
license its property for authorized commercial purposes.182 
Copyright law provided the backbone for these arrangements between 
Lucasfilm and others because copyright in Lucasfilm’s works guided its 
commercial and noncommercial licensing arrangements. However, 
copyright law gave Lucasfilm the right to decide who received a license, on 
what terms, and for what purposes. Copyright grants the property right that 
Lucasfilm used in making these arrangements.183 The law gave Lucasfilm 
the authority to decide at any time that it no longer wished to encourage or 
 
179 Joe Mullin, Disney Owns Lucasfilm: Will It Have Room for Star Wars Fan Movies?, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 30, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/10/disney-owns-
lucasfilm-will-it-have-room-for-star-wars-fan-movies/ [http://perma.cc/M8BQ-PX7P]. 
180 Id. (“In 2007, Lucasfilm even released tools that would more easily enable remixing of Star 
Wars content. A top Lucasfilm lawyer, Jeffrey Ulin, began speaking at conferences and to the media 
about the value of fan mash-ups and remixes. Those works were ‘part of keeping the love of Star Wars 
and the franchise alive. . . . We’re really trying to position ourselves for the next [thirty] years,’ Ulin 
told the Wall Street Journal in 2007.” (alteration in original)). 
181 Id. 
182 See List of Star Wars Books, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Star_Wars_books 
[http://perma.cc/T2TS-FMMY] (list of authorized Star Wars books). 
183 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (copyright provides the owner of the work the exclusive rights to 
control reproduction and distribution of their works, thus allowing a copyright owner to create express 
and implied licenses). 
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support noncommercial fan works, a right that Disney could now exercise 
if it chose to put a stop to Casey Pugh’s work on The Empire Strikes Back 
remix. 
The fact that there has been a lot of consumer remixing of the Star 
Wars movies to date does not mean that there has been no copyright 
infringement. It simply means that Lucasfilm, and now Disney, has not 
aggressively objected to the uses. Of course, an objection by a copyright 
holder to a remix also does not mean the remix is in fact an infringing use. 
The creators of the remix could potentially argue estoppel, waiver, license, 
and fair use defenses. The problem is that there may be no way to know, 
with any certainty, which uses are infringing under the current state of 
copyright law, and the fair use doctrine in particular. 
In the case of Star Wars: Uncut, Casey Pugh has commented that he 
initially avoided getting in touch with someone at Lucasfilm because he 
thought such a communication would be “difficult.”184 Subsequently, he 
discovered that George Lucas himself was a fan of the project,185 
particularly because of its noncommercial, fan-focused spirit.186 
Nevertheless, this position is at the discretion of the copyright holder. 
Another potential challenge for creative remixers is that remixes of 
any kind will typically draw from several copyright sources. Thus, there are 
more copyright holders who potentially could bring actions, which 
increases the chilling effect on this kind of creative activity. Even where a 
creative project is based on one work, like a movie, different copyright 
concerns may arise in relation to different aspects of the work. As with Star 
Wars: Uncut, the apparent ability for a remixer to use script, dialogue, 
characters, or plotlines in a creative remix might not support an ability to 
use the soundtrack: for example, if copyright in the soundtrack is held by 
the composer separately from the other elements of the original film. 
Would it be better, or even possible, for copyright law to create clearer 
guidelines for when consumer remixes of protected content should not be 
regarded as infringing? This question is not easy to answer. Because 
copyright law is intended to encourage artistic innovation, one could argue 
that ideally copyright law should support, for example, both the original 
 
184 Coffin, supra note 100 (“I didn’t reach out to them initially because I knew getting in touch 
would be very difficult. But I launched the project and [four] months later, I got a call and found out 
that they were huge fans of the project and flew me out there to see if there were ways we could 
collaborate in the future. They’ve always been huge supporters of it and it’s been great to have their 
blessing.”). 
185 Id.  
186 Id. (“For me, this has always been an art project built by one person, rather than a commercial 
project. So I think he appreciated that, the fact that this was an experiment and not some company 
trying to take advantage. I’ve made no money from the project, but it’s just such an exciting ride for 
me.”). 
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Star Wars movies and Casey Pugh’s project. Copyright law should protect 
the original movies against unauthorized copying as an incentive to create 
those movies in the first place. It should also protect Pugh’s remix for the 
same reasons. Both works are creative in nature, and both draw from the 
fabric of popular culture. The original Star Wars movies utilize common 
popular storylines, themes, characters,187 and, according to some 
commentators, usurp specific copyrighted materials that arguably render 
the movie itself an unauthorized derivative work.188 The protection afforded 
the original movie assists Lucasfilm and Disney to propertize and 
commercialize it, while any protection afforded to Pugh would encourage 
artistic innovation in the fan community. 
However, copyright law does not work that way. An unauthorized 
derivative work such as Star Wars: Uncut cannot be made without 
potentially infringing the derivative works right. The Copyright Act 
provides that the maker of an unauthorized derivative work cannot herself 
assert any copyright in the derivative work to the extent that it makes 
unauthorized use of another’s work.189 Copyright law’s stance on derivative 
works may seem unnecessarily draconian when applied to a 
noncommercial project created for expressive purposes by fans (and rabid 
consumers) of the original. 
For the reasons discussed above, the fair use defense is unlikely to be 
of much practical use to expressive consumers in these kinds of 
situations.190 There is no upfront certainty for expressive consumers that a 
fair use defense would succeed in any given case. In any event, many of 
these consumers will not have the financial wherewithal to defend against 
infringement litigation. When he started with Star Wars: Uncut, Casey 
Pugh likely took the view that he was engaging in a noncommercial fair 
use, but he was understandably hesitant about contacting Lucasfilm to 
 
187 CHRISTOPHER VOGLER, THE WRITER’S JOURNEY: MYTHIC STRUCTURE FOR WRITERS 286–90 
(3d ed. 2007) (analyzing the original movie as a paradigmatic example of the familiar “Hero’s Journey” 
story structure from popular culture and mythology). 
188 See, e.g., Charlie Jane Anders, Did George Lucas Copy Star Wars’ Opening Catchphrase from 
an Ad in a Fashion Magazine?, IO9 (Dec. 26, 2012, 1:53 PM), http://io9.com/5971374/did-george-
lucas-copy-star-wars-opening-crawl-from-an-ad-in-a-fashion-magazine [http://perma.cc/ZD9E-6BEE] 
(wondering whether George Lucas lifted the opening catchphrase and sequence in Star Wars from a 
1974 advertisement featured in Vogue); Kirby Ferguson, Everything Is a Remix Part 2 (Remix Inc.), 
EVERYTHING IS A REMIX (Feb. 1, 2011), http://everythingisaremix.info/blog/everything-is-a-remix-part-
2 [http://perma.cc/G7E3-57WX] (detailing how George Lucas’s Star Wars itself draws on and 
extensively borrows (without permission or payment) from the films of Akira Kurosawa, Flash Gordon, 
John Wayne and spaghetti westerns, Leni Riefenstahl propaganda films, Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, and 
other works).  
189 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“The subject matter of copyright . . . includes compilations and 
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists 
does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”). 
190 See supra Part II.C. 
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discuss it. Many other creators might not engage in such remixing activities 
in the first place for fear of attracting copyright infringement liability. 
Another problem with relying on fair use is the fact that large scale 
consumer remixes such as Star Wars: Uncut may have a significant 
commercial potential, unlike individual video mash-ups and more small-
scale fan works. The recognition Star Wars: Uncut received in the media, 
and by receiving an Emmy award, suggests a strong commercial potential. 
Even if Pugh originally had no intentions to commercialize the work, what 
would stop him from changing his mind once he realized he had a 
potentially valuable commercial property on his hands? If he did decide to 
release the work commercially, or use his website for profitable 
advertising, or charge fees to access the work on his website, there is 
nothing that could stop Disney from pursuing him under copyright law or 
demanding royalties in relation to any profits he made. Many creative 
activities that start out as purely expressive pursuits end up being 
commercialized so this is not a minor concern. 
In the past, copyright law has not squarely dealt with these kinds of 
temporal problems—the idea that something that might initially qualify as 
a fair use might later grow into commercial competition with the copyright 
holder. In the next Part, we advance some suggestions for dealing with this 
temporal issue. Our hope is that we may foster debate about the ways in 
which copyright principles could be developed to provide more leeway for 
creative remixing than currently exists while still protecting commercial 
markets for copyright holders. 
III. REFORMING COPYRIGHT AND FACILITATING REMIX 
There are a number of ways copyright laws and policies might be 
revised to strike a better balance between the commercial interests of 
copyright holders and the expressive interests of individual and group 
remixers. None of them are perfect, but some of them may well be more 
effective than the current situation if the aim of the law is to foster and 
maximize artistic innovation. Any new laws or policies will need to strike a 
careful balance between a number of competing interests. It is not our hope 
to definitively strike the appropriate balance with our suggestions; after all, 
we recognize the limitations of our expertise and understand that there will 
be no panacea to the problems we have identified with the current regime. 
Rather, we aim to generate a discussion as to how a better balance may 
ultimately be achieved. In particular, we advocate that law- and 
policymakers should focus not only on the needs of copyright holders, but 
also on the important contributions remixers make to society in terms of 
self-expression, communication, collaboration, and self-actualization. 
Our suggestions for reform include the following: (1) removal or 
reworking of the strict liability basis for copyright infringement, at least in 
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the case of noncommercial works; (2) tempering the size of statutory 
damages or available criminal penalties for noncommercial or innocent 
copyright infringement; (3) an “intermediate liability” proposal that gives 
courts options other than finding infringement or fair use;191 (4) developing 
clearer ex ante guidelines for fair use, particularly with respect to the 
commercially driven factors one and four; and (5) removing 
noncommercial remixing activities from the definition of “derivative 
work.” Clearly any of these suggestions that change notions of fair use will 
also somehow have to deal with the temporal issue of derivative works that 
are not initially intended to be commercialized, but later achieve a 
commercial potential. This problem should not be insurmountable in 
practice. The more difficult issue will be whether there are any ways to 
create fairer, more clearly delineated guidelines for what uses of 
copyrighted works in the “transformative consumer use” area should be 
exempted from infringement liability. 
A. Reworking Strict Liability 
Each of us has argued previously—and in more detail than this Article 
will allow—that the strict liability basis for copyright law needs to be 
revisited in the digital age.192 There are a number of reasons to revisit strict 
liability for the Web 2.0 generation. Everything we do online involves 
making digital copies of something—underlying code that represents 
functionality (as in software) or content (as in digital music, movies, 
images, and text).193 Thus a copyright regime that attaches strict liability to 
any unauthorized copies places substantial power over our online lives in 
the hands of powerful commercial content owners who often threaten 
litigation first and negotiate later.194 Additionally, while everything online 
involves copying, it is very difficult for Internet users to know when the 
 
191 This proposal is based on the theory advanced in TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 155–66. More 
detail can be found in that text. The theory is merely summarized infra Part III.C  
192 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 142–43 (“[O]ne of the most inequitable and unbalanced aspects 
of our copyright regime is its strong embrace of strict liability. There is no mens rea requirement in 
copyright. Thus, everyone in the chain of supply can be held hostage to claims of infringement, a 
particularly pernicious state of affairs in the digital era where works can pass through multiple agents 
and contact points before getting to an end user. Moreover, in a networked world where we all violate 
copyright law multiple times a day, the risk of penalties—even for innocent infringements—can be 
staggering.”); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and Innocent Copyright Infringement, 
13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 767, 775–84 (2011) (questioning the appropriateness of strict liability to 
copyright in the digital context). 
193 See Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285, 290 (2009) (“[I]n cyberspace, the legal distribution 
process requires consumer copying.”).  
194 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 145 (describing a situation where record label EMI mistakenly 
claimed copyright infringement against a website that was authorized to give away MP3 versions of its 
copyrighted songs for free). 
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copying is actually permissible and when it is not. This places the risks and 
burdens of innocent infringement squarely on the shoulders of those 
playing with technology for noncommercial purposes.195 
The risks of copyright infringement are increased exponentially with 
Web 2.0 technologies with respect to remix culture. As discussed above, 
the whole point of remixing is to take what has gone before and build a 
new kind of “collage” out of it to create or express something new.196 When 
one considers the massive amount of copying in furtherance of creativity 
and self-expression, and the meager likelihood that much of this activity 
will cause any harm to copyright holders, one must at least begin to 
question the need for strict liability, at least in this context. 
Although the strict liability doctrine has clearly provided much 
protection to copyright holders, it has also perhaps granted them more 
power than their creations warrant, particularly when applied in a Web 2.0 
culture. There are a number of potential solutions to this imbalance. One 
option would be to remove strict liability from copyright law and put the 
burden on copyright holders to establish that the alleged infringer intended 
to infringe, at least for transformative uses of works (rather than for 
outright piracy or bootlegging). Copyright holders would likely argue that 
this would impose an unfair burden on them and that it would be very 
difficult for them to prove the state of mind of an alleged defendant. 
However, there are many torts and crimes that incorporate mens rea as an 
element. There is no reason why a similar jurisprudence could not develop 
in copyright. 
Additionally, establishing a defendant’s state of mind in a copyright 
infringement action may be easier in the digital world than it would have 
been in the pre-digital era. People can, and frequently do, express their 
intentions online with respect to use of a copyright work. A brief look at 
YouTube shows that many individuals borrowing from copyrighted works 
attach notices to their remixes indicating that they believe they are making 
a fair use or that “no infringement was intended.”197 
While, of course, these assertions in and of themselves do not mean 
anything decisive in terms of the law, in context, they can speak to a 
defendant’s best intentions, no matter how naive. Where someone posts a 
homemade remix on YouTube for no commercial profit and attaches a “no 
infringement” notice, the totality of the circumstances usually (though not 
always) suggests the defendant intends no injury to the economic value of 
 
195 Id. (“[I]t can be difficult for [Internet] users to ascertain whether a website truly has permission 
to distribute the copyrighted work. Due to the strict liability nature of our copyright regime, users 
frequently face unwitting infringement liability, a growing problem . . . .”); Snow, supra note 193. 
196 See supra Part I.B. 
197 Lipton, supra note 19, at 22–23. 
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the original work, even if technically an infringement may have been 
committed because of the current strict liability basis of copyright law. If 
strict liability were removed from copyright law for strictly noncommercial 
uses in such contexts, Internet users would have much greater leeway to 
engage in creative play with segments of copyrighted works. 
Another option to mitigate the harshness of the strict liability doctrine 
in the expressive remixing context would be to adopt noncommercial 
remixing as a defense to copyright infringement outside of the fair use 
defense. Given the vagueness of fair use, it might make sense to create a 
new defense for noncommercial digital copying that excuses the kinds of 
activities described in this Article. The defense would cease to apply if the 
defendant later attempted to commercialize the work in question. However, 
it would remain in force as long as the defendant was not making an 
unauthorized commercial profit from the plaintiff’s work. The other way of 
achieving this kind of defense would be to develop a “noncommercial 
remix defense” as an aspect of fair use. This could be done legislatively or 
judicially and is discussed in more detail below.198 
B. Tempering Remedies for Noncommercial Infringement 
The potential deterrents for an innocent copyright infringer, or at least 
a noncommercially motivated infringer, are very grave. Under the 
Copyright Act, statutory damages may be available to plaintiffs far in 
excess of the licensing fees they could otherwise recoup under a negotiated 
agreement with defendants.199 Criminal charges have also been threatened 
and imposed against individual copyright infringers.200 The likely 
congressional intent behind the statutory damages regime in copyright law 
is that it can be very difficult for copyright holders to establish actual 
damages in some cases, and absent actual damages, potential infringers 
would not face much of a deterrent effect.201 If defendants only have to pay 
actual damages—often just the licensing fee they would otherwise have 
paid had they negotiated with the copyright holder in the first place—there 
will be little downside to infringing.202 
 
198 See infra Part III.B.  
199 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 147 (noting the imposition of statutory damages deters 
defendants by imposing punishment over and above the licensing fees they would have had to pay if 
they had negotiated with the plaintiff). 
200 Id. at 150–51 (noting several cases of criminal charges being brought against individuals for 
activities that probably did not cause much in the way of commercial harm to copyright holders); see 
also Lipton, supra note 19, at 38–42 (observing the imposition of criminal charges for an unauthorized 
video of a small segment of the movie The Twilight Saga: New Moon). 
201 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 147. 
202 Id. (“[W]ithout the availability of statutory damages, one could not adequately dissuade 
infringement. Absent some form of statutory or punitive damages, potential infringers would usurp the 
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Although there may be good reason for the existence of statutory 
damages, their current design (both in terms of their expansive range and 
the way they are imposed203) creates significant problems. Existing law 
allows plaintiffs who have timely registered their works to recover up to 
$150,000 in statutory damages per act of willful infringement (plus 
recovery of attorneys’ fees). Such a policy might make sense when seeking 
to deter pirates and bootleggers. But it makes no sense to use the same 
blunt instrument to squelch transformative activity that promotes progress 
in the arts. In addition, bootlegging can both be difficult to catch and 
require heavy deterrence. Neither of these rationales exists for 
transformative works. 
To wit, under current law, artists such as the Beastie Boys and Biz 
Markie are treated as little different from the pirates of Napster, Grokster, 
and Megaupload. For example, with its more than one hundred samples, 
Paul’s Boutique could create $7.5 million in potential liability for the 
Beastie Boys if just half of the samples are not deemed “fair use.”204 A 
mash-up that makes use of several songs can quickly rack up millions of 
dollars in liability—even if the mash-up is noncommercial in nature, causes 
no cognizable actual damages, and generates no revenues whatsoever. This 
is the potential liability that any artist faces if she is on the wrong side of 
the “fair use” Rubicon. 
Judicial rulings over the past two decades have caused copyright’s 
Sword of Damocles, through massive statutory damages, to precariously 
hang over the heads of would-be sampling and remixing artists and, in turn, 
 
works of others with impunity, knowing that, in a worst case scenario, they may only have to pay the 
licensing fee they should have paid at the outset.”). 
203 The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment requires that statutory damages 
awards remain within the province of juries. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 
340 (1998). This creates numerous problems. Among other things, there is little precedent and few 
parameters to guide juries, who do not have the luxury or ability to sift through prior case law. As such, 
award assessments can be wildly disparate under similar fact patterns, raising potential due process 
concerns. Meanwhile, significant statutory damage awards regularly issue in cases with thin-to-
nonexistent evidence of actual damages. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. 
of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002) (awarding 
$31.68 million in statutory damages for copyright infringement in the absence of any evidence of actual 
damages); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 449, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (imposing a 
$275,000 statutory damages award in the absence of any evidence of actual damages), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 262 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Nate Anderson, Thomas Verdict: Willful 
Infringement, $1.92 Million Penalty, ARS TECHNICA (June 18, 2009, 4:32 PM EST), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/06/jammie-thomas-retrial-verdict/ [http://perma.cc/53RH-
X3CL] (noting the assessment of a $1.92 million statutory damages award in a peer-to-peer file sharing 
case where the trial judge recognized that the actual damages were approximately $50).  
204 Courts can award statutory damages of up to $150,000 per act of willful infringement. See 
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). So, if a court found the Beastie Boys liable for maximum statutory 
damages penalties for just half (50) of the samples used on Paul’s Boutique, the record could result in 
$7.5 million in infringement liability.  
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have fundamentally changed the type of creative output the public can and 
does enjoy. The threat of enormous statutory damages results in 
overdeterrence of potentially lawful, and clearly beneficial, future content 
creation. 
Many artists facing copyright’s statutory damages regime have elected 
to eschew sampling, mash-ups, or any other type of transformative activity 
altogether. Even when someone who makes use of a copyrighted work has 
a good chance at a successful fair use defense, the terrifying consequences 
of being wrong will lead rational actors to get a license—even where the 
law does not require one. As a result, millions of dollars are spent every 
year to obtain licenses for works that are in the public domain or otherwise 
do not require a license to use.205 This permission culture stifles legitimate 
artistic activities rather than promoting the arts. 
These problems with the current statutory damages regime have been 
exacerbated with the emergence of the Web 2.0 remix culture and with 
crowdsourcing production in particular. Even if a copyright holder were 
willing to license the work for these purposes, chances are that copyright 
holders would seek royalties that remixers could not afford. Because most 
remixers are not intending to commercialize their work, they are unlikely to 
be in a position to pay royalties purely for the purpose of engaging in 
expressive remixing. Even if some remixers could pay, the imposition of 
royalties would create a two-tiered system of creativity: wealthy 
individuals who could afford royalties could engage in creative remixing, 
whereas those lacking the financial wherewithal to pay royalties would not 
have the same access to building blocks of cultural expression. 
Because negotiating licenses in the remix context is generally not 
realistic, imposing damages in excess of a standard licensing fee is even 
less realistic. When one is not talking about commercial uses of valuable 
intellectual property, conceiving of damages and penalties in terms of 
commerce makes little practical sense. It is also likely to be the case that 
whatever penalties are imposed, many expressive remixers will be unable 
to pay them. Thus, many people who want to be creative with elements of 
popular culture have the choice of potentially going bankrupt or deciding 
not to engage in the creative expression in the first place. 
Again, one might argue that copyright holders would never sue those 
who are not intending to make commercial profits from unauthorized uses 
of protected works. But recent history has demonstrated that this is not the 
case. Copyright holders have brought a significant volume of litigation 
against private individuals who have infringed copyrights. This has played 
 
205 See Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1030 (2006); John Tehranian, 
Curbing Copyblight, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 1003–04 (2012). 
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out most notably in the peer-to-peer file-sharing scenario.206 However, 
infringement litigation has also been threatened—and takedown notices 
issued—with respect to poor-quality home videos on YouTube that 
incorporate snippets of copyrighted material.207 
Removing or minimizing statutory damages and criminal penalties for 
noncommercial copyright infringements may be a step in the right 
direction. Judges would have more leeway to award insubstantial or de 
minimis damages for noncommercial infringements. However, to avoid 
chilling expression and bringing private individuals into court on copyright 
infringement suits, it may be better to find a way for expressive 
noncommercial conduct to be regarded as noninfringing. Thus, perhaps a 
reworking or clarifying of the fair use defense to exempt noncommercial 
remixing activities would be a better option.208 
Another limitation to focusing on the tempering of damages is that 
many individuals are likely deterred from using copyrighted materials for 
fear of litigation itself, as opposed to fear of the kinds of damages or 
penalties that are currently available. As a result, altering the basis for 
awarding damages or criminal penalties may not have sufficient practical 
impact on individual Internet users. Those who do not think they will be 
caught and sued will proceed with their activities regardless of awareness 
of potential damages, and those whose expression is currently chilled 
would continue to be deterred even if penalties were lessened for 
noncommercial infringement. 
C. An Intermediate Liability Approach209 
One of the problems with the current copyright regime is its binary 
approach to infringement—either an activity is an infringement attracting 
potentially significant penalties or it is not an infringement, attracting no 
penalties.210 This “zero-sum” approach is standing in the way of courts’ 
abilities to effectively balance First Amendment concerns and the 
promotion of individual self-expression against intellectual property 
 
206 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 149 (noting that thousands of actions have been commenced by 
the RIAA and its members against individual file-sharers). 
207 Id. at 135–36. 
208 See infra Part III.D.  
209 Portions of Part III.B–C come from Khanna & Tehranian, supra note 22.  
210 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 155 (“The statutory scheme of the present regime forces courts 
to choose between two extreme options: infringement or fair use. If courts find infringement, hefty 
statutory damages often ensue . . . that are often well in excess of actual damages. However, if courts 
find fair use, an unauthorized user of a copyrighted work is able to exploit (without permission or 
payment) the work of another with impunity, thereby free riding on the creative success of the original 
author.”). 
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protection.211 This problem could be mitigated by the development of an 
“intermediate liability” approach under which a transformative or 
productive use of a copyrighted work that would otherwise be an 
unauthorized derivative work would be exempt from statutory or actual 
damages.212 
We propose a “transformative use” defense that could be argued by a 
defendant in the alternative to a fair use defense.213 Whereas the fair use 
defense would exempt the defendant completely from liability,214 the 
transformative use defense would result in an exemption from actual and 
statutory damages as well as injunctive relief.215 However, it would require 
the defendant to evenly divide any profits made from the infringing work 
with the plaintiff.216 
The transformative use defense would only be available to defendants 
who had registered their work with the Copyright Office.217 The Copyright 
Office should issue guidelines to provide some ex ante guidance on the 
kinds of uses likely to qualify as transformative uses.218 Transformative 
uses, at a minimum, would include parody, satire, digital sampling, and 
appropriationist modern art.219 The kinds of remixes under consideration in 
this Article, particularly large crowdsourced projects, would fall under the 
category of appropriationist modern art. Appropriationist modern art makes 
use of preexisting works, especially those laden with cultural significance 




212 Id. at 155–56. 
213 Id. at 156 (“Under the intermediate liability alternative, a court would first determine whether a 
work is infringing. If the work infringes, a defendant could proffer two defenses—fair use and 
transformative use.”). 
214 Id. (“The fair use defense would continue to function as it currently does, providing immunity 
from liability for individuals meeting the four-part balancing test delineated in section 107 of the 
Copyright Act.”). 
215 Id. at 157 (“For all such transformative uses . . . intermediate liability would attach. The 
resulting transformative use would be exempt from actual and statutory damages as well as injunctive 
relief.”). 
216 Id. (“By default . . . the original author of the copyrighted work and the transformative user of 
that work would evenly divide all profits resulting from the commercial exploitation of the 
transformative work.”). 
217 Id. at 156 (showing that in order to qualify as a transformative use, the defendant “must have 
properly registered their work as a transformative use with the Copyright Office”). 
218 Id. (“[T]he Copyright Office would issue guidelines that define certain categories of use as 
transformative, thereby providing ex ante guidance on what constitutes transformative use.”). 
219 Id. (“Under this new intermediate liability option, transformative uses would include . . . 
parody, satire, digital sampling, and appropriationist modern art, as each of these activities draws upon 
copyrighted works to create a new work of art imbued with new expressions that criticize or illuminate 
our values, assess our social institutions, satirize current events, or comment on our most notorious 
cultural symbols.”). 
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The intermediate liability proposal is attractive on a number of levels. 
It provides the ex ante guidance on acceptable uses of copyrighted works 
that is currently missing from the fair use defense. It allows the creators of 
transformative works to continue to engage in their expressive activities, 
while requiring them to share any commercial profits made with the 
original copyright holder. This mitigates any chilling effect that might 
currently be felt under a regime that potentially imposes significant 
monetary damages and that gives little upfront guidance to expressive 
remixers about acceptable uses of others’ work. Additionally, if 
transformative users do not make any commercial profits from the 
transformative use, they will not be required to pay the copyright holder 
anything.220 Although the transformative use defense itself could only be 
fully determined in the litigation context (as with fair use), the guidelines 
for transformative use would give a better idea of the likely outcome of 
litigation than if the defendant had to rely solely on fair use. 
Defenders of copyright’s status quo might attack this intermediate 
liability solution as unprecedented. However, there is important prior 
experience to support its viability. Specifically, the so-called compulsory 
mechanical license provision of the Copyright Act is similar to the 
intermediate liability solution and is already in operation. It illustrates the 
tremendous benefits that both content industries and the public can make 
with new uses of the copyrighted works of others without permission but 
with payment. It also has functioned remarkably well for more than a 
century. 
Copyright law generally provides creators of an original work with a 
series of exclusive rights, including the rights to reproduce, publicly 
distribute, and create derivatives of the work. However, since 1909, 
musical compositions (and only musical compositions) have enjoyed an 
exception to this rule. The reason for this exemption relates to a now long-
defunct technology—the player piano.221 But, the exemption remains alive 
 
220 Id. at 157–58 (“Most importantly, noncommercial users would be free to appropriate 
copyrighted works for transformative purposes without compensation. Thus, the proposed regime 
unburdens precisely the type of speech that has historically received the greatest protection under First 
Amendment jurisprudence—noncommercial expression.”). 
221 In 1908, the Supreme Court determined that perforated rolls of music used with player pianos 
did not constitute copies subject to the exclusive rights secured under the Copyright Act. See White-
Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). Because the rolls were only machine-
readable (i.e., they could not be read as musical compositions by even those skilled in the arts and were 
therefore not intelligible to humans—a requirement of the term “copies”), the Court reasoned that “we 
cannot think that they are copies within the meaning of the copyright act.” Id. In response to the ruling, 
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1909, which held that piano rolls created from underlying 
musical compositions constituted unauthorized reproductions of those compositions. Copyright Act of 
1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075. The Copyright Act of 1909 simultaneously granted those who 
wished to manufacture and distribute mechanical embodiments of musical compositions a compulsory 
license (known as the compulsory mechanical license) under certain conditions. Id. § 25(e). 
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today. Under the exemption, anyone can record a “cover” version of a 
copyrighted, nondramatic musical composition and distribute copies of it 
without the permission of the original composer.222 Thus, without any 
authorization from the original artist, Johnny Cash can record a hauntingly 
frail acoustic version of Nine Inch Nails’s more muscular and menacing 
“Hurt”; Luna a dreamy, lo-fi cover of Guns N’ Roses’s “Sweet Child O’ 
Mine”; William Shatner a loungy take on Pulp’s alternative rock classic 
“Common People”; and Dynamite Hack an acoustic folk-rock rendition of 
NWA member Eazy-E’s gangsta rap “Boyz-N-the-Hood.” As the history of 
modern music has demonstrated, the public, artists, and the industry have 
thrived as a result of the availability of the compulsory mechanical 
license.223 The cover song exemption has spawned innovation and 
transformation in music, and the intermediate liability proposal would do 
the same in other areas of the arts. 
Admittedly, however, the intermediate liability proposal does have a 
few potential shortcomings. The codification and potential explanation of 
the notion of transformative use potentially erodes a copyright holder’s 
derivative works right.224 One solution to the inherent conflict between 
facilitating transformative use and protecting a copyright holder’s 
derivative works right would be to expressly exempt certain uses of a 
 
222 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). Instead, cover artists need only provide notice of their intention to 
record a cover song and then make payment of a fixed per-album fee to the copyright owner. Id. 
§ 115(b)–(c). Although fully transformative uses of musical compositions cannot be made under the 
statute, cover artists are free to tinker with the composition to adapt it to a particular musical genre: “A 
compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent 
necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved . . . .” Id. 
§ 115(a)(2). 
223 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Achenbach, Grey Area: How Recent Developments in Digital Music 
Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of Compulsory Licensing for Sample-Based Works, 
6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 187, 209–11 (2004) (noting the benefit of the cover song right to the music 
industry and upstart and established artists alike). For example, although Bob Dylan is a remarkable 
songwriter and musician, there are few who would consider his rendition of “All Along the 
Watchtower”—a song he both composed and recorded—superior to the cover of this song by Jimi 
Hendrix. Hendrix’s version of “All Along the Watchtower” helped launch him into rock’s pantheon, but 
it also secured the place of Dylan’s composition in rock history. The availability of the compulsory 
mechanical license therefore enabled Hendrix to expand his popularity and introduced a whole new 
audience to the works of both Dylan and Hendrix. Without this exemption from liability, however, the 
world would have never enjoyed these cherished contributions to rock history. This “free” (rather than 
“permission”) culture has allowed the creation of over 500 different covers of the song, all paying Bob 
Dylan royalties. 
224 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 159 (“Adoption of an intermediate liability scheme would 
inextricably necessitate a reexamination of the derivative rights doctrine. . . . [T]he creation and 
dissemination of transformative works advances the constitutional goal of progress in the arts. 
However, the broad exclusive right of copyright owners to prepare derivative works has swallowed up 
the ability of transformative users to escape infringement liability, thereby undermining the key goal of 
the federal copyright regime.” (footnote omitted)).  
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copyright work from the derivative works right.225 Certain noncommercial 
and largely expressive works could be allowed to exist outside the 
derivative works doctrine, despite drawing on original works to create 
something new. 
Although creating exemptions from the derivative works rights sounds 
like simply creating the intermediate liability regime in practice, the 
difference is that exempting certain works from the exclusive right would 
avoid infringement in the first place. The intermediate liability solution, on 
the other hand, is a defense to an infringement. The option of reworking the 
notion of a derivative work to exempt noncommercial remixing is taken up 
in more detail below.226 
Another potential shortcoming with the intermediate liability proposal 
as applied to expressive remixing relates to the requirement that 
transformative works should be registered with the Copyright Office as a 
prerequisite to raising the transformative use defense.227 Many remixers 
will not have the time, knowledge, or ability to register their works with the 
Copyright Office. In most cases, remixing is a hobby with which people 
engage during their spare time. Hobby remixers are unlikely to want to take 
the time and effort of registering every single creative remix they make 
with the Copyright Office. This would be an extremely time-consuming 
enterprise, and would be ultimately unrewarding in many cases given that 
there is often no way of knowing upfront which copyright holders are 
likely to bring infringement actions against remixers. 
Additionally, in cases where remixes are crowdsourced and many 
people have grouped together to create the transformative work, it may be 
unclear who is most appropriately regarded as the author or owner of the 
work. This confusion would also make registration difficult in practice, 
particularly if more than one participant in a crowdsourced remix sought to 
assert ownership rights. The registration requirement would work most 
effectively in cases such as the Star Wars: Uncut scenario, where a large-
scale crowdsourced transformative work is effectively organized and 
ultimately created by one central “author.” In this scenario, the identity of 
the author is relatively clear despite the contributions by multiple 
filmmakers. 
There are clearly situations in which the intermediate liability 
approach would promote creative innovation both in terms of the creation 
of original works and in the subsequent creation of transformative 
derivative works. However, we recognize that there would still be many 
situations in which transformative works would not be registered and 
 
225 See infra Part III.E.  
226 See infra Part III.E. 
227 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 156. 
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where any infringement litigation could result in damages that would not be 
commensurate with the harm actually suffered by the copyright holder. 
Another challenge for intermediate liability would arise in cases in 
which a remixer borrowed from a number of different copyright sources. 
Where the remix is based on one original work, it would be a fairly simple 
matter to arrange a profit-sharing mechanism between the plaintiff and 
defendant. For example, Star Wars: Uncut would be a good candidate for 
this kind of arrangement if it were commercialized. The profits might be 
shared between Pugh and Disney, and Pugh could also share profits with 
individual contributors to his project. The adoption of an intermediate 
liability scheme would encourage organizers of creative crowdsourcing 
projects to negotiate upfront with contributors for their appropriate share of 
any resulting profits. 
However, in situations involving more collage-style remixes that draw 
from multiple different sources, courts would have more trouble in 
determining how profit-sharing arrangements should work. Should all 
potential plaintiffs be required to participate in the same litigation so that 
one court could create a profit-sharing order that covers all interested 
parties? If not, a second copyright holder who sues a remixer after the first 
copyright holder has already secured half the profits may be relegated to 
only a quarter of the profits made by the transformative user. To be 
effective in these circumstances, an intermediate liability proposal may 
need to include a mechanism for second copyright holders to obtain a fairer 
share. 
None of these profit-sharing problems arise in situations in which the 
remixer has not made any commercial use of the transformative work,228 
and this will probably be the case in many situations of expressive 
remixing. In sum, the intermediate liability proposal has promise, and could 
be developed in a way that promotes expressive use of protected works. 
However, at least in the context of expressive remixing, lawmakers would 
have to deal with issues of multiple defendants and multiple plaintiffs to 
make the option truly workable. Additionally, lawmakers should consider 
the necessity of the registration requirement for transformative works. At 
the very least, any intermediate liability scheme ultimately adopted might 
allow defendants to register their transformative works after the 
commencement of infringement proceedings against them. 
The intermediate liability proposal recognizes the cost of copyright 
infringement to the creative industries and the need to combat its pernicious 
effects. As a result, it does nothing to undermine the ability of content 
creators to enforce their legitimate rights against those who make 
 
228 Id. at 157 (noting that in the cases of noncommercial transformative uses, no compensation 
would be payable to a copyright holder under the intermediate liability regime). 
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wholesale copies of their works without permission. Under the plan, 
copyright holders can still vigorously pursue pirates with hefty statutory 
damages and the possibility of criminal sanctions. But enterprising artists 
would be protected from the same blunt weapons wielded against pirate 
enterprises. 
The impact of the intermediate liability solution upon transformative 
users and the licensing market for copyrighted content would be quite 
profound. The proposal would advance the constitutionally mandated goals 
of the copyright system by stimulating more artistic creation and wealth 
generation for new content and sampled content alike. Specifically, small 
and emerging DJ’s, rappers, and hip–hop artists could sample from major 
recordings without the threat of litigation. More established artists like U2, 
Beck, and Eminem would see the costs of sampling for their future works 
driven down in a competitive marketplace. Rights holders could no longer 
refuse to allow any uses of their content or to hold out for obscenely high 
licensing rates. The gains would be felt throughout the arts, from 
documentary directors (who would no longer face exorbitant rates in order 
to sample a few seconds of a film clip), to appropriationist artists and their 
exhibiting galleries (who would no longer fear massive liability for creating 
and exhibiting art that borrows cultural symbols or other preexisting 
works), to crowdsourcers who may currently fear the threat of an 
infringement action. 
Under our proposal, negotiations between artists would be informed 
by the fact that transformative users can always make use of underlying 
materials, even if they do not reach a deal with rights holders—so long as 
they account for those rights holders through a payment of a portion of 
their realized profits. Beyond the world of music, artists of all stripes would 
enjoy the right to create using underlying source materials without fear that 
they will face millions of dollars in legal liability or, worse yet, find the 
FBI raiding their house in the middle of the night.229 
Parties would be free to contract around default damages rules for 
transformative uses. But the proposed intermediate liability scheme helps 
set a reasonable starting point for negotiations between the original 
copyright owner(s) and the transformative user and it prevents the 
ambiguity of the fair use defense and the in terrorem effect of copyright’s 
statutory damages regime from deterring valuable artistic activity. It also 
prevents original copyright owners from discriminating between favorable 
and unfavorable transformative uses of their copyrighted works. In short, in 
 
229 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (providing criminal penalties for willful copyright 
infringement for, inter alia, “purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2319(b) (2012) (providing for up to five years imprisonment for a first offense and up to ten years 
imprisonment for a second offense for criminal infringement of works with a retail value of more than 
$2500). 
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practice, the intermediate liability proposal would ensure that parties 
negotiate for more reasonable rates on royalties. 
Existing content owners whose works are sampled will also reap 
economic benefits by sharing in the profits stemming from transformative 
works, many of which would never have existed otherwise. New listeners 
may also be attracted to older content when they find out that it has been 
sampled. As an example, DJ Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album, mashing up 
The Beatles’ The White Album and Jay-Z’s The Black Album, likely served 
as a music discovery tool for those who may not have been Beatles or Jay-
Z fans before.230 Admittedly, it is possible that some artists who receive 
windfall benefits under the current regime would receive less money under 
this proposed system. But for policymakers, concerns about promotion of 
progress in the useful arts—rather than enrichment of a very few in 
perpetuity—should drive the framing of copyright law. And the 
intermediate liability solution recognizes that law should enable the 
unfettered functioning of the creative marketplace, not inhibit it. 
D. Clarifying Fair Use 
A corollary to the intermediate liability regime described above231 
would be simply to streamline the contours of the fair use defense. As 
discussed above, fair use is notoriously unpredictable, which significantly 
hinders its putative purpose of protecting the rights of consumers and users 
to access copyrighted works.232 Consider a few high-profile examples from 
the past few decades. Whereas Biz Markie was hit with liability (and a 
referral to the district attorney’s office for potential jail time) for sampling 
several bars of a piano line from Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone Again 
(Naturally),”233 the Beastie Boys escaped liability when they sampled a six-
second riff from jazz flutist James Newton.234 The writer of an unauthorized 
take on Gone with the Wind (told from the perspective of the slaves) won 
 
230 See, e.g., Renee Graham, Jay-Z Meets the Beatles on ‘The Grey Album’ Mix, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 
12, 2004, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-02-12/features/0402120058_1_grey-album-jay-z-
black-album [http://perma.cc/HK4E-2YA3] (“Danger Mouse has brought the Beatles into the hip-hop 
generation while giving props to the timeless innovation of the band, which through its boundary-
breaking musical philosophy may have helped pave the way for the free-flowing deconstructionism of 
rap music.”). 
231 See supra Part III.C.  
232 This is not the only problematic aspect of the fair use doctrine. As Professor Tehranian has 
argued, far from protecting public access to copyrighted works, the fair use doctrine reintroduced 
natural-law elements into the copyright infringement calculus that have, paradoxically, led to a decline 
in user rights. See John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 465 (2005). 
233 Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
234 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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the right—under the fair use doctrine—to publish her work over the 
objections of the Margaret Mitchell Estate,235 whereas the writer of an 
unauthorized send-up of Catcher in the Rye (in which an elderly Holden 
Caulfield confronts author J.D. Salinger) was deemed to be infringing and 
had his book effectively banned in the United States.236 Appropriationist 
artist Jeff Koons has experienced the fair use doctrine’s inexplicable 
vacillation first hand. He has had federal appellate courts weigh in on two 
infringement suits for his unauthorized use of source materials in his art. In 
the first case, a court denied his fair use defense and found him liable.237 
The court even ordered him to pay fees to the plaintiff.238 In the second 
case, a court found his work transformative and, therefore, excused him 
from liability under the fair use doctrine (though the court declined to 
award him his fees).239 All told, there is little consistency in the way courts 
weigh the various factors dictated by statute. 
Wildly disparate outcomes on similar fact patterns have resulted, 
making copyright cases difficult to decipher. For example, as Rebecca 
Tushnet has pointed out, “After decades of litigation, it is still difficult to 
tell when and whether one can photocopy copyrighted materials, even for 
scientific research.”240 As we have seen with musicians, nebulous fair use 
standards have prompted self-censorship in the creative process. Potential 
“infringers” are, understandably, unwilling and unable to bear the 
substantial costs of litigation and liability even where it does not or should 
not exist. 
Commentators in recent years have made several proposals about 
reworking the operation of the fair use defense to give users of copyright 
works clearer ex ante guidance about whether their uses may be found to be 
infringing.241 Creating executive guidelines, via the Copyright Office, 
regarding what uses are the most likely to be considered fair use would be 
helpful and would serve much the same purpose as the guidelines 
contemplated in the intermediate liability proposal.242 In fact, in recent 
years, some public interest groups have attempted to create best practice 
 
235 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
236 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
237 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
238 Id. at 313. 
239 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006).  
240 Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common 
with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 
42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24 (2000). 
241 Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without 
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy 
Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
111 (2005).  
242 See supra Part III.C.  
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guidelines for fair use in particular contexts such as for the documentary 
film industry.243 
Increased awareness of the nature of fair use and more presumptions in 
favor of regarding particular classes of uses as fair use would go a long 
way towards striking a more appropriate balance between free speech and 
proprietary copyrights. An advantage of this approach over the 
intermediate liability approach is that it would not necessarily require 
legislative reform, but rather the development of executive guidelines more 
clearly explaining fair use. Legislative clarification of § 107 of the 
Copyright Act is another possible solution. Some countries have more 
clearly delineated legislative notions of fair dealing, which are exempted 
from copyright infringement liability.244 There is no reason why American 
legislation could not also be more specific in this regard. 
Another advantage of this approach is that asserting a fair use would 
not require registration of a work as a fair use. Of course, the intermediate 
liability proposal could also be revised to remove the registration 
requirement for transformative works, or to allow more flexibility in terms 
of when a transformative work is required to be registered.245 
The most significant difference between clarifying the contours of fair 
use and adopting an intermediate liability regime would be that fair use is a 
complete defense to infringement, whereas the intermediate liability regime 
requires profit sharing between a plaintiff and a defendant.246 In this regard, 
the intermediate liability proposal may result in fairer outcomes than a 
clarified fair use doctrine, and could serve as a basis for legislative 
compromise with content holders, who will understandably be loath to give 
up existing rights without getting anything in return. The problem with the 
current situation is that courts have to choose between two extreme options: 
infringement that can result in exorbitant damages or fair use that results in 
none.247 Clarifying the contours of fair use does not create the potential 
middle ground that the intermediate liability approach could provide. 
Creating greater guidance about the contours of fair use in the digital 
age is an important goal and one that should be pursued in any event, given 
the strict liability basis of copyright and the fact that digital technologies 
rely on copying as the basis of all functionality. However, reformulating 
the contours of fair use may not in and of itself provide appropriately 
 
243 See, e.g., AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF 
BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/
sites/default/files/fair_use_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/6F9G-9ZFZ]. 
244 See Lipton, supra note 108, at 960.  
245 See supra Part III.C.  
246 See supra Part III.C. 
247 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 155. 
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tailored solutions to all of the challenges to copyright law posed by 
expressive remixing. 
E. Tempering the Derivative Works Right 
Many of the proposals described in the previous sections are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, arguably inconsistent with the derivative works 
right currently reserved to copyright holders. This is nothing new. As we 
explained in the Introduction, the existing statutory language of the 
derivative rights doctrine has always existed in tension with the modern fair 
use balancing test. Under §§ 101 and 106(2) of the Copyright Act, 
copyright holders enjoy the exclusive right to create and disseminate works 
based on their original works, including prequels and sequels, translations, 
and adaptations. Moreover, unless the new work is deemed to be a fair use, 
the creator of an unlawful derivative work is not entitled to assert any 
copyright in that work to the degree that it makes impermissible use of 
another’s copyrighted work.248 
To the extent that our proposals would grant the creators of derivative 
works greater leeway to create and use those works without fear of 
infringement liability, or at least without fear of significant penalties, these 
proposals are inconsistent with the derivative works right. But that is the 
point: it is time to reexamine the contours of the derivative works right. 
Just as the vague contours of the fair use defense have stifled free speech,249 
the expansive notion of derivative works has also squelched expressive 
activities.250 
Commentators have suggested that the derivative works right (and the 
transformative use aspect of the first fair use factor with which it is in 
tension) should be reworked in order to further the important goals of 
artistic innovation and personal expression.251 It would certainly be possible 
for Congress to more clearly delineate and streamline the definition of 
derivative works to effectively exempt certain classes of works from 
infringing the derivative works right. While we here suggest that expressive 
 
248 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“The subject matter of copyright . . . includes compilations and 
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists 
does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”).  
249 See supra Part II.C. 
250 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 160 (“As copyright law historically evolved from the narrow 
right to forbid duplication of one’s original work to a broader right to interdict . . . any borrowing of the 
elusive intellectual essence of one’s original work, an artificial hierarchy of works emerged to 
rationalize the expansion of an author’s property right. . . . This unchallenged hierarchy . . . begs 
reconsideration on two important grounds: the important role of transformative use in the advancement 
of the arts, and the value of transformative use on expressive grounds.”). 
251 See, e.g., id., at 160–61; Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 
1213, 1267–68 (1997). 
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remixes could be exempted from the definition of derivative works, others 
have suggested a broader approach.252 
Naomi Voegtli, for example, has suggested that the definition of 
derivative works could be fine-tuned to contemplate only: (1) works that 
exhibit little originality in their own right; (2) works that unduly encroach 
on the economic prospects of the source work(s); and (3) basic translations, 
recordings, art reproductions, abridgements, and condensations of source 
work(s).253 In other words, her approach would exempt transformative 
works from the notion of derivative works, thus reducing any potential 
conflict between the intermediate liability proposal suggested above and 
the derivative works right.254 Such an approach to derivative works would 
also lessen any tension between the derivative works right and a 
streamlined notion of fair use as suggested above.255 
Voegtli’s approach would effectively reserve to copyright holders 
limited markets we might deem them exclusively entitled to exploit, 
including perhaps markets for translations, recordings, and art 
reproductions.256 But, by the same token, it would open new expressive 
opportunities for those who wanted to engage in expressive uses of existing 
works in a manner that would not clearly impact the basic market for those 
existing works and would not otherwise diminish a copyright holder’s 
reasonable right to exploit her work commercially. This approach would 
work well in the case of expressive remixes like Star Wars: Uncut. Even if 
Pugh were to commercialize his work, it would not likely encroach on any 
realistic market that Disney may want to exploit. In fact, it may help 
Disney in light of Disney’s plans to release new sequels to the original Star 
Wars films by creating a buzz around the storylines that immediately 
precede those in the new films.257 
In any event, a more streamlined definition of derivative works might 
exempt such a project from liability as an infringing derivative work. The 
 
252 Voegtli, supra note 251, at 1267. 
253 Id. 
254 TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 160. 
255 See supra Part III.D.  
256 It is worth noting that the expansive notion of derivative rights is a product of the past century 
and, in former times, we (as a society) did not believe that copyright holders had the legitimate 
exclusive right to such derivatives as translations. See Tehranian, supra note 232, at 470–80. 
257 Eric Eisenberg, Star Wars: Episode 7 – What We Know So Far, CINEMABLEND, http://www.
cinemablend.com/new/Star-Wars-Episode-7-What-We-Know-So-Far-36488.html [http://perma.cc/
E3NU-LACN] (“In 2005 it looked like the Star Wars saga was officially over. Lucasfilm and Twentieth 
Century Fox released Star Wars Episode III: Revenge of the Sith, which completed the prequels trilogy 
and tied the story back to the first film in the series. It was done, finished, kaput, and ended. But then 
along came Disney. In October 2012 the studio brokered a $4.05 billion deal to buy Lucasfilm, and with 
the deal came the announcement that they would be starting production on a whole new trilogy of Star 
Wars films that would keep the epic story going for years and years to come.”). 
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same result would be achieved under a narrower approach that would 
simply exempt expressive remixing from the scope of the derivative works 
right. Whether one prefers a general reworking of the definition of 
derivative works, such as that suggested by Voegtli, or a sector-specific 
exemption for particular classes of works, the resulting balance between 
proprietary copyrights and free expression would represent a significant 
improvement over the current situation. 
Either form of reworking the derivative works definition could take 
place as a stand-alone reform effort or as part of a package that includes 
streamlining fair use or adopting an intermediate liability regime. Now is a 
particularly good time to consider these proposals in light of the House 
Judiciary Committee’s ongoing review of American copyright law.258 In 
this vein, it is important to understand that the proposals suggested in this 
Part are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One could explore all of them 
at the same time or focus on one or more of them. We suggest that even 
outside the context of expressive remixing, there is merit to rethinking 
copyright damages and strict liability, and to refining fair use and the 
definition of derivative works. We also advocate the development of 
compromise regimes such as the intermediate liability proposal described 
above to avoid the “all or nothing” basis for copyright infringement that 
exists under current law. 
CONCLUSION 
The advent of the digital age, and particularly the exponential 
development of interactive Web 2.0 technologies, has created dramatic new 
challenges for copyright law. Because all online activities involve copying 
to some degree, the strict liability basis of copyright law raises a potential 
clash between technological innovation and free expression on the one 
hand, and proprietary copyrights on the other. Digital consumer service 
providers such as Apple and Sony may encourage us to use their 
technologies to explore digital creation, but content industries reserve the 
right to sue if we use the fabric of popular culture for our own creative 
purposes. Litigation against private individuals is a reality, and penalties 
for infringement can be extreme.259 
We have focused our discussion on the particular expressive outlet of 
digital remixing that borrows from the copyrighted works of others. We 
have used creative crowdsourcing as a case study to emphasize the ways in 
which current laws fall short of striking an appropriate balance between 
fostering innovation in original works and enabling subsequent expression 
employing those works as building blocks. However, the implications of 
 
258 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra Part III.B.  
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our concerns resonate further, applying to a wide range of activities from 
fan fiction and expressionist art to various musical genres such as hip–hop 
and electronica. 
Our goal has been to identify current imbalances in the law between 
the rights of copyright holders and the rights of users of copyright works, 
and to suggest ways in which a more appropriate balance could be 
developed. To this end, we have put forward a number of proposals, 
namely: revisiting the strict liability basis of copyright, rethinking the 
current statutory damages regime, creating a workable intermediate liability 
proposal to provide a middle ground between liability and fair use, 
streamlining fair use, and fine-tuning the derivative works doctrine. 
Each of our suggestions raises challenges for lawmakers, and each 
comes with inherent advantages and disadvantages. Some of these 
proposals may work particularly well together, such as reworking the 
definition of derivative works and adopting an intermediate liability regime 
for transformative works. Others may operate well on their own, such as 
revisiting the nature of copyright damages. 
Our aim in making these suggestions for reform is not to assert that 
one or more of them would necessarily be preferable to the others. Instead, 
we believe that any of them has the potential to strike a better balance than 
the current copyright regime. Presumably, one of the tasks of those 
reviewing American copyright law under the House Judiciary Committee’s 
plan will be to consider the balance between existing copyrights and 
downstream creative efforts in today’s interactive digital world. It is our 
hope that the suggestions made in this Article will assist lawmakers in 
thinking seriously about reforms to copyright law that will better promote 
artistic innovation in transformative works and free expression more 
generally. Otherwise, the law will continue to preserve and perpetuate a 
system of artistic and expressive “haves” and “have-nots” that chills too 
much valuable speech and innovation. 
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